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Weeding Out Injustice: 
Amnesty for Pot Offenders 
by MITCHELL F. CRUSTO 
The legalization of marijuana raises a quintessential jurisprudential 
question: Whether such laws apply retroactively to exonerate past pot 
offenders.  The answer to this question affects millions of Americans who are 
suffering from the negative effects of past pot-related offenses.  Some such 
offenders are serving life sentences without the possibility of parole, while 
all such offenders face negative impacts on their everyday lives.  This Article 
advances the normative claim that past pot offenders have a constitutional 
right to the retroactive application of marijuana legalization laws.  Further, 
it suggests that a tailored concept of amnesty is a practical means to 
exonerate such offenders, freeing some from imprisonment and allowing all 
of them to enjoy productive lives without the stigma of a criminal record. 
 
Introduction 
In the movie, Back to the Future,1 Marty McFly traveled back in time 
to save his future existence.2  While in the past, Marty met with some people 
 
       J.D., Yale Law 1981; M.A., Oxford 1985; Distinguished Professor, Loyola University New 
Orleans College of Law. Thanks to the Alfred T. Bonomo, Sr. Family; the Rosario Sarah LaNasa 
Memorial Fund; the Henry F. Bonura, Jr. Professorship; Loyola students Lindsey Freihoff, 
LaTreshia A. Hamilton, Bayle M. Beermann, and Laurel C. Taylor; and colleagues at the American 
Association of Law Schools’ panel (Douglas A. Berman, Robert A. Mikos, and Seth Stoughton); 
the Southeastern Association of Law Schools’ panels; the John Mercer Langston Writers 
Workshops (Chez P. Arnett, Mario Barnes, Frank Rudy Cooper, and S. David Mitchell); Attorney 
Christian Schank; and my colleagues at the Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, 
especially Andrea Armstrong.  
 1.  BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985); see also, AFI Catalog of Feature Films, 
https://catalog.afi.com/Catalog/moviedetails/55763 (last visited June 26, 2019). 
 2.  Id. 
A - CRUSTO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:34 AM 
368 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:3 
who were smoking3 “weed.”4  Now imagine that Marty were arrested, 
convicted, and imprisoned for possession of marijuana with the intent to 
distribute.  This presents the issue: if Marty returned to the future and merely 
possessed pot in a state that legalized marijuana, should he be entitled to 
erase his past criminal offense?  If the answer is no, Marty might be serving 
a life sentence without the possibility of parole or at least suffer from the 
negative effects of a criminal record.5  The Marty McFly hypothetical raises 
a quintessential legal issue for States6 that have decriminalized or legalized7 
 
 3.  See Hollyweeds, The Weed Scene in Back to the Future, YOUTUBE (Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://youtu.be/hZVdrp_zO40. 
 4.  In this Article, the terms “weed,” “pot,” and “marijuana” will be used interchangeably to 
refer to what is legally known as “marijuana.” See Katy Steinmetz, 420 Day: Why There Are So 
Many Different Names for Weed, TIME (Apr. 20, 2017), http://time.com/4747501/420-day-weed-
marijuana-pot-slang/ (noting over twelve hundred slang terms are related to marijuana).  For 
purposes of this Article, the legal term “marijuana” or “marihuana” is defined as that provided for 
in The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 
202, 84 Stat. 1236, 1247-49 (1970) (hereinafter “CSA”).  Title II of the CSA, 21 U.S.C. Section 
802, provides:  
The term ‘marihuana’ means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing 
or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its 
seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber 
produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks 
(except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such 
plant which is incapable of germination.  
 5.  See infra note 14, discussing the direct and collateral effects of marijuana-related criminal 
offenses. 
 6.  As of 2019, ten States, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and the Northern Mariana Islands 
have legalized the recreational use of cannabis, while thirty-three states, Guam, Puerto Rico, the 
U.S. Virgin Islands and D.C. have legalized the medical use of the drug.  See DISA, Map of 
Marijuana Legality by State, https://disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state (last visited June 
26, 2019).  See also, MARIJUANA MOMENT, “Marijuana Legislation Tracking,” https://www.mari 
juana moment.net/bills/ (last visited June 9, 2019) (reporting that as of June 9, 2019, there were 
over eleven hundred marijuana bills in state legislatures and Congress for the 2019 sessions).  This 
Article focuses on states that have “legalized” marijuana; however, its observations provide 
important lessons for the federal government, states, municipalities, and nations that have or are 
contemplating such legal reforms.   
 7.  For purposes of this Article, the term “legalization” includes laws that license the sale of 
pot and have reduced or eliminated civil or criminal penalties for recreational use or possession.  
See, e.g., MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, Types of Marijuana Reform Laws, https://www.mpp.org/ 
issues/legislation/types-of-marijuana-policy-reform-laws/ (last visited June 26, 2019) 
(distinguishing “decriminalization,” wherein a state enacted a law that imposes penalties other than 
jail time for possession of marijuana, from “legalization,” wherein a state enacted a law making it 
legal for adults who are 21 and older to use marijuana and allows for the legal sales and purchase 
of marijuana.).  For example, in California, the decriminalization of marijuana preceded 
legalization.  See California’s Moscone Act, California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 527.3, 
passed in July 1975, made possession of one ounce of marijuana a misdemeanor punishable by a 
hundred dollar fine, rather than a criminal offense, with some exceptions such as possession on 
school grounds.  See also, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, Drug War Statistics, http://www.drugpolicy. 
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certain marijuana-related activities and use.8  That issue is whether those 
laws9 eliminating some marijuana-related criminal offenses,10 apply 
retroactively,11 to modify, negate, or erase the criminal records of past pot 
offenders12 (hereinafter “amelioration”13).  The answer to this question 
affects the lives of millions of Americans who are negatively impacted by 
the collateral consequences of a criminal arrest,14 as well as the many people 
who are currently incarcerated due to marijuana-related convictions.15 
 
org/issues/drug-war-statistics (last visited June 26, 2019) (noting that twenty-two states have 
legalized or removed the threat of jail time for the simple possession of small amounts of 
marijuana); see also, infra Part I.   
 8.  Even where legalized, marijuana is still highly regulated, prohibiting the use by and sale 
to minors, driving and operating heavy equipment under the influence, and restrictions on most 
sales by only licensed dispensaries.  See, e.g., California Proposition 64, Sen. Res. 64, 2017-2018 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=20172 
0180AB64 (the “Adult Use of Marijuana Act,” enacted in 2016).  See also, Christopher Ingraham, 
California Arrested Nearly Half a Million People for Pot Over the Past Decade, WASH. POST (Aug. 
18, 2016, 10:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/18/ california-
arrested-nearly-half-a-million-people-for-pot-over-the-past-decade/, citing a report from the Drug 
Policy Alliance.   
 9.  See infra Part I.  
 10.  See, e.g., Prop 64, supra note 8. 
 11.  The terms “retroactivity” and “retroactively,” for purposes for this Article, refer to a 
change in a substantive criminal law, not a procedural one, that reduces or eliminates the 
culpability of marijuana activities or use, after a conviction is final.  The issue of the retroactivity 
of laws in general is not limited to the legalization of marijuana. See generally, Russell L. 
Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations: An Analysis of Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 167, 187 (1986) (noting that “[c]urrent approaches are . . . inadequate because 
they fail to give judges meaningful standards by which to decide retroactivity issues.”).  See 
also, infra Part I, B and Part III.   
 12.  The term “pot offender(s),” for purposes of this Article, includes persons affected by any 
aspect of marijuana laws, including investigatory stops, searches, arrests, pleas, convictions, 
incarcerations, paroles, and/or criminal records, as well as the “collateral consequences” of such 
laws. See infra note 14.  
 13.  The term “amelioration,” for purposes of this Article, means eliminating and/or reducing 
arrests or convictions for past marijuana criminal offenses for actions, which happened today would 
not be deemed criminal. 
 14.  See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, Federal Collateral Consequences for Marijuana 
Convictions, https://www.mpp.org/issues/criminal-justice/federal-collateral-consequences-for-ma 
rijuana-convictions/ (last visited July 22, 2019); JUSTICE CENTER, The National Inventory of 
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited June 26, 
2019) (defining “collateral consequences” of a criminal arrest or conviction as “legal and regulatory 
sanctions and restrictions that limit or prohibit people with criminal records from accessing 
employment, occupational licensing, housing, voting, education, and other opportunities,” and 
providing a searchable database of the collateral consequences in all U.S. jurisdictions and an 
extensive resources and bibliography).  
 15. About twenty percent, or about four hundred thousand of those incarcerated, are 
imprisoned for marijuana-related offenses.  See Drug War Statistics, supra note 15 (noting that the 
U.S. spends over fifty billion dollars on the war on drugs, annually, with over six hundred thousand 
people arrested in 2016 for marijuana law violations, of which eighty-nine percent were only for 
possession); see also, American Civil Liberties Union, Report: The War on Marijuana in Black and 
White (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-
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In addition to distributive justice, recent developments compel us to 
critically analyze whether past pot offenders are entitled to retroactive 
amelioration.  First, there are a growing number of States that have legalized 
marijuana,16 challenging the view that marijuana is a dangerous drug.17  
Second, these States are taking positions relative to both the retroactivity of 
the new laws and to amelioration of past offenses,18 which arguably 
contradict United States Supreme Court decisions on the retroactivity of 
changes in substantive criminal standards.19  And third, many States 
recognize that past marijuana laws have greatly contributed to the problems 
related to a broken criminal justice system,20 including mass incarceration21 
 
rfs-rel1.pdf (reporting that “[b]etween 2001 and 2010, there were over 8 million pot arrests in the 
U.S. That’s one bust every 37 seconds and hundreds of thousands ensnared in the criminal justice 
system . . . .  Enforc[ement] . . . costs us about $3.6 billion a year, yet the War on Marijuana has 
failed to diminish the use or availability of marijuana.”). 
 16.  See DISA and MARIJUANA MOMENT, supra note 6; see also, Theresa Waldrop, 
Californians Line up to Legally Buy Recreational Pot, CNN (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/01/01/us/california-marijuana-sales/index.html (noting that many other states will follow) 
Further, many municipalities have also legalized or decriminalized marijuana.  See generally, Barry 
Malone, Regulating Legalized Marijuana at the Local Level, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 
29, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/ tyl/topics/municipal-
law/regulating_legalized_marijuana_the_local_level.  
 17.  See CSA, supra note 4. Cf. Alex Pasquariello, Federal Lawsuit against Sessions and DEA 
Says Marijuana’s Schedule I Status Unconstitutional, THE CANNABIST (July 25, 2017), 
http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/07/25/marijuana-schedule-i-lawsuit-unconstitutional/84473/ 
(last visited July 22, 2019) (citing to Washington, et al., v. Sessions, et al., filed as Case 1:17-cv-
005625 (filed July 24, 2017) in the Southern District Court of New York, wherein the Plaintiffs 
claim the classification of cannabis as a Schedule I substance is so “irrational” that it violates the 
U.S. Constitution).  See generally, Lisa Rough, Cannabis and the Constitution: A Brief History of 
Cannabis in the US, LEAFLY (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-
101/cannabis-and-the-constitution-a-brief-history-of-cannabis-in-the-u-s.  
 18.  See infra Part I.  
 19. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that its previous ruling 
in Miller v. Alabama, 567 25 U.S. 460 (2012), that a mandatory life sentence without parole should 
not apply to persons convicted of murder committed as juveniles, should be applied retroactively).  
See infra Part III.   
 20.  See supra note 15. 
 21. The United States incarcerates two million people, which is more than any other country.  
See generally, MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); JOHN PRAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (critiquing descriptive accounts of 
mass incarceration that focus too heavily on nonviolent drug-related offenses and sentence lengths); 
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, PRISON POLICY 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html (cautioning that 
“being locked up is just one piece of the larger pie of correctional control.  There are another 
840,000 people on parole (a type of conditional release from prison) and a staggering 3.7 million 
people on probation (what is typically an alternative sentence).  Given the often-onerous conditions 
of probation, policymakers should be cautious of ‘alternatives to incarceration’ that can easily 
widen the net of criminalization to people who are not a threat to public safety.”); Drug War 
Statistics, supra note 15.   
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and racial disparities,22 particularly to the devastation of communities of 
color.23 
In response to these developments, this Article advances the 
normative claim that past pot offenders are entitled to retroactive 
amelioration,24 in States that have legalized marijuana.  I argue that such 
retroactive amelioration has deep support in constitutional provisions and 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions.25  Moreover, I suggest that, due to large 
numbers of offenders, over a long period of time, retroactive amelioration 
is best achieved through the use of amnesty.26 
As an overview, this Article is divided into three parts.  Part I explains 
the sources and the nature of the quandary that past pot offenders face, as 
they navigate their way through retroactivity rules and amelioration 
 
 22.  See infra notes 89-97, and 174.  See also, Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: 
Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 689 (2016) (noting “[d]espite that legalization, 
marijuana usage continues to disproportionately impose serious consequences on racial minorities, 
while white entrepreneurs and white users enjoy the early fruits of legalization”).   
 23.  See infra Part I. One noted anti-incarceration scholar, Michelle Alexander, argues that 
merely legalizing marijuana is inadequate relief for embattled racial minorities ravaged by the War 
on Drugs: 
After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color, a drug war that has 
decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness through entire communities, and 
a war that has fanned the flames of the very violence it was supposedly intended to 
address and control; after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools 
to fail; we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now? I think we have to be willing, as 
we’re talking about legalization, to also start talking about reparations for the war on 
drugs, how to repair the harm caused.  
April M. Short, Michelle Alexander: White Men Get Rich from Legal Pot, Black Men Stay in Prison, 
ALTERNET (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/drugs/michelle-alexander-white-men-get-
rich-legal-pot-black-men-stay-prison.  See also, Jonathan Blanks, The War on Drugs Has Made 
Policing More Violent: What Can be Done to Curb the Excessive and, Sometimes, Predatory 
Policing that has Emerged from the Drug War?, DEMOCRACY JOURNAL (July 19, 2016), https:// 
democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-war-on-drugs-has-made-policing-more-violent (noting that 
“[p]olice are incentivized to initiate unnecessary contact with pedestrians and motorists, and they 
do so most often against ethnic and racial minorities.  Such over-policing engenders resentment 
among minority communities and jeopardizes public safety.”).  
 24. The phrase “retroactive amelioration,” for purposes of this Article, means the right to be 
judged by newly enacted, marijuana legalization law, retroactively to past crimes of a similar 
nature, using all legal methods or means available to officially absolve someone from blame for a 
marijuana-related offense. See infra Part II; see also, Expungement: Removing the Lifelong Stigma 
Caused by Marijuana Prohibition, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/issues/ 
criminal-justice/expungement-removing-lifelong-stigma-caused-marijuana-prohibition/ (last visited 
July 22, 2019).  
 25. See infra Part III.   
 26. The term “amnesty,” for purposes of this Article, means a complete exoneration for a large 
group of individuals (general or blanket amnesty), granted by the government that obliterates all 
legal remembrances of the offense Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary. 
org/amnesty/ (last visited July 22, 2019) (defining amnesty as “[a] pardon extended by the 
government to a group or class of people, usually for a political offense”).  See infra Parts II and 
III, and Appendix.   
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practices.  Part II proposes a solution that recognizes a constitutional right to 
retroactive amelioration.  Part III explains how a right to retroactivity relief for 
past pot offenders is founded on constitutional principles and Supreme Court 
decisions.  Further, this Article proposes a code that government officials and 
policymakers should adopt to provide pot offenders swift and certain remedies 
for the damages done to them from the failed War on Drugs.27 
This Article has greatly benefited from the works of others directly 
related to the issue.28  It benefits greatly from other scholars on topics 
relevant to this one including retroactivity,29 retroactive ameliorative relief,30 
 
 27.  The term “War on Drugs,” hereinafter “WOD,” for purposes of this Article, means the 
initiative to discourage the production, distribution, and consumption of psychoactive drugs, 
particularly marijuana.  See infra Part I, A. 
 28.  See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement 
Practices (Apr. 18, 2018), Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 444; Federal Sentencing 
Reporter, Vol. 30, 2018, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165001 (last visited July 22, 2019); 
Robert A. Mikos, Do (Should) State Marijuana Reforms Apply Retroactively?, VANDERBILT 
UNIVERSITY, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY (Dec. 2, 2017), https://my.vander 
bilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2017/12/do-should-state-marijuana-reforms-apply-retroactively; Sophie 
Quinton, In These States, Past Marijuana Crimes Can Go Away, STATELINE (Nov. 20, 2017, 10:09 
AM), https://www.google.com/amp/s/m.huffpost.com/us/entry/us_5a12e8e8e4b 023121e0e94e3/ 
amp; Katie Zezima, Cities, States Work to Clear Marijuana Convictions, Calling It a States’ Rights 
Issue, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ national/2018/ 
02/01/cities-states-work-to-clear-marijuana-convictions-calling-it-a-states-rights-issue; Associated 
Press, New York Gov. Signs Bill to Cut Penalties for Marijuana Possession, Expunge Some 
Convictions, KTLA5 (July 29, 2019, 12:21 PM), https://ktla.com/2019/07/29/new-york-gov-signs-
bill-to-cut-penalties-for-marijuana-possession-expunge-some-convictions/. 
 29. See infra Part I, B. 
 30. See infra Part III.   
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habeas corpus,31 post-conviction remedies,32 sentencing guidelines,33 
procedural criminal law,34 drug law,35 capital punishment,36 racial 
 
 31.  This Article does not address post-conviction relief—appeals of criminal convictions, 
including release, new trial, modification of sentence, re-arraignment, retrial, custody, and release 
on security, or a federal habeas corpus proceeding, including for constitutional considerations such 
as ineffective assistance of counsel.  See generally, F. A. STEPHENS, WINNING HABEAS CORPUS 
AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF (7th ed. 2017); KELLY PATRICK RIGGS, ET AL., POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF: THE APPEAL (2017). Cf. Peter Westen, Lex Mitior: Converse of Ex Post Facto and Window 
into Criminal Desert, 18 NEW CRIMINAL LAW REV. 167, 167-213 (Mar. 20, 2015), University of 
Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 455, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2588143 (last 
visited July 15, 2019) (questioning why a state’s prospective repeal of the death penalty should not 
preclude prosecuting a defendant for a capital murder that was committed before repeal). 
 32. There is thoughtful scholarship on the retroactivity of criminal law changes as it relates to 
convictions, primarily prior to finality.  See, e.g., S. David Mitchell, Blanket Retroactive 
Amelioration: A Remedy for Disproportionate Punishment, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 
14 (2013); Howard J. Krent, Determining the Retroactive Reach of Decriminalization and 
Diminished Punishment, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 7 (2013); S. David Mitchell, In 
with the New, Out With the Old: Expanding the Scope of Retroactive Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (assessing the efficacy of the Court’s 
approach to retroactivity when the Court finds “new” law); Comment, Today’s Law and 
Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. 
REV. 120 (1972); See generally, Richard Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in 
American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 37 (2014).  Additionally, retroactivity relative to other 
drug offenses has received some attention.  See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Retroactivity and Crack 
Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 53 (2013) (arguing that “the strong presumption 
against retroactive application of reduced punishments reflected in Dorsey is neither historically 
grounded nor constitutionally compelled”). 
 33. See Nathaniel W. Reisinger, Note, Redrawing the Line: Retroactive Sentence Reductions, 
Mass Incarceration, and the Battle between Justice and Finality, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299 
(2019) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) 
and noting “When policymakers recognized the injustice of the disparity between sentences for 
crack and powder cocaine, they passed the Fair Sentencing Act to correct that injustice. But the 
ongoing failure to make that law retroactive created a new injustice with a ‘new set of disparities.’” 
(footnotes omitted).  See also, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANNOUNCES THE 
RELEASE OF 3,100 INMATES UNDER FIRST STEP ACT, PUBLISHES RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
SYSTEM (July 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-
3100-inmates-under-first-step-act-publishes-risk-and (reporting on the implementation of First 
Step Act of 2018, which provides the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to 
reduce the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine threshold amounts triggering 
mandatory minimum sentences).  
 34. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the admission of an 
elicited incriminating statement by a suspect, not informed of the right to remain silent violated 
several provisions of the U.S. Constitution); see also, Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) 
(holding that the Miranda decision did not apply retroactively as that “would have a disruptive 
effect on the administration of justice” by requiring a review of a “significant” number of criminal 
convictions). 
 35. See, e.g., ALEX KREIT, ILLEGAL DRUG AND MARIJUANA LAW (2019); ROBERT A. MIKOS, 
MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY (2017).  
 36. See, e.g., Daniel G. Bird, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due 
Process Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2003); Matthew R. Doherty, 
The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Application of Laws in Death Penalty 
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profiling,37 institutional racism,38 unconscious bias,39 mass incarceration,40 
war on drugs,41 reform of the criminal justice system,42 misdemeanor 
decimalization,43 and amnesty.44  Building on the works of other scholars, 
this Article uniquely analyzes whether the Constitution grants past pot 
offenders a right to retroactive amelioration, in States that have legalized 
marijuana.45 
 
Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 445 (2004), http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/ 
iss2/6. 
 37. See, e.g., End Racial Profiling Act of 2015, H.R. 1933, 114th Cong. (2015), https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1933; Devon Carbado & Patrick Rock, What 
Exposes African Americans to Police Violence, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (identifying racial 
profiling as a factor in police shootings). 
 38. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Symposium, Whren at Twenty: Systemic Racial Bias and the 
Criminal Justice System, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 923 (2016). 
 39. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115 (2016); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit 
Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013). 
 40. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 21, Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical 
Perspectives on Police, Policing, and Mass Incarceration, 104 GEO. L.J. 1531 (2016) (positing that 
the imprisonment of African-American men is one means by which society removes minority 
populations from mainstream life).  
 41. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why 
the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381 (2002). 
 42. See, e.g., Michele L. Jawando & Chelsea Parsons, 4 Ideas That Could Begin to Reform 
the Criminal Justice System and Improve Police-Community Relations, Center for American 
Progress (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2014/12/ 
18/103578/4-ideas-that-could-begin-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system-and-improve-police-c 
ommunity-relations/; Ivana Dukanovic, Note, Reforming High Stakes Police Departments: How 
Federal Civil Rights Will Rebuild Constitutional Policing in America, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
911 (2016).   
 43. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 
(2015). 
 44. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Nationalist Case for Amnesty, ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/immigration-amnesty/582688/ (arguing 
that granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants would benefit millions of American citizens); 
Leila N. Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (2006), 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol81/iss3/5 (last visited Aug. 13, 2019) (examining recent state 
and international practice regarding amnesties for jus cogens crimes, which has strengthened the 
prohibition against amnesties); Robert W. Burg, Amnesty, Civil Rights, and the Meaning of Liberal 
Republicanism, 1862-1872, 4 AMERICAN NINETEENTH CENTURY HISTORY, 29 (2003) (imaging 
how the amnesty program that Liberal Republicans envisioned for the post-Civil War era would 
have resulted in a less violent and corrupt Reconstruction polity).  
 45. This Article focuses on the retroactivity of laws, as it applies to a large group of similarly 
situated offenders, and does not discuss changes in culpability for past offenders due to changes in 
individual cases, for example, due to the admission of exonerating evidence.  This Article will not 
discuss post-conviction remedies relative to habeas corpus.  There is well-established jurisprudence 
that dictates an inmate’s right to post-conviction remedies based on the constitutional doctrine of 
habeas corpus.  See, e.g., People v. Boyd, No. 12CA2607, 2015 WL 4760414 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 
13, 2015) (holding that Colorado’s legalization law retroactively overturns marijuana possession 
convictions that had not become final on appeal before the new law took effect). 
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The next section describes the problems that past pot offenders face 
when they seek retroactive amelioration in a State that has legalized 
marijuana.  Overall, it shows that many such States did not address this issue 
when they adopted the new laws.  Moreover, in States where retroactivity is 
granted, the relief provided is both superficial and inconsistent. 
I. Retroactive Amelioration Quandary46 
When a State legalizes marijuana, past offenders suffer from the 
uncertainty of how the law applies to them, if at all, and ultimately face a 
retroactive amelioration quandary.47  In this Part I, I show how the law fails 
to provide reparative justice for past offenders by providing a brief history 
of the criminalization of marijuana, explaining the shortcomings of the rules 
on retroactivity, and noting that retroactivity does mean swift and 
meaningful amelioration. 
A. Criminalization of Marijuana48 
Any meaningful approach to the retroactive amelioration of past pot 
offenses must be assessed within the context of the criminalization of 
marijuana and its negative impacts on society.  We begin with a brief history 
of the WOD49 to show that it was fundamentally flawed from the outset and 
fell short of achieving its stated goal of reducing drug use.  On the contrary, 
the WOD caused, and continues to cause, great harm to individuals and to 
communities. 
1. Brief History of the WOD 
The first national regulation of pot was the Marihuana (sic) Tax Act of 
1937 (hereinafter “MTA”) which created elaborate enforcement rules, and 
levied an expensive tax and penalty for marijuana handlers.50  Shortly after 
MTA’s passage, marijuana was taken off the list of permissible medicines 
approved by the federal government.51  In the 1950s, marijuana regulation 
went from civil penalties to criminal punishment, with mandatory sentencing 
 
 46. The phrase “retroactive amelioration quandary,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the 
condition that past pot offenders face as they seek exoneration for past offenses, in light of 
inconsistent retroactivity rules and unclear, restrictive marijuana legalization laws. 
 47. See, supra note 46.  
 48. See generally, Rough, supra note 17; Scott C. Martin, A Brief History of Marijuana Law 
in the United States, TIME (Apr. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4298038/marijuana-history-in-america.  
 49. See supra note 27.  The federal prohibition of pot is absolute, very serious, and carries 
lengthy punishments and costly fines.  The prohibition includes the study and use of marijuana as 
medicine.   
 50. The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937). 
 51. Mark Eddy, Cong. Research Serv., RL33211, Medical Marijuana: Review and Analysis 
of Federal and State Policies 9 (2010), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33211.pdf. 
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and increased penalties, through the passage of the Boggs Act of 195252 and 
the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.53 
During the 1960s, some States’ regulation of marijuana reflected the 
reality that marijuana usage had become common among white middle-class 
college students.54  By the end of the decade, several States had 
decriminalized the drug, while many others had weakened their laws against 
cannabis use.55  Despite this movement towards decriminalization, in 1969, 
President Richard M. Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” namely, to eradicate, 
interdict, and incarcerate drug offenders.56  In 1970, he signed into law the 
Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter “CSA”),57 which, inter alia, 
prohibited marijuana and classified it as a Schedule 1 dangerous drug.58  
President Nixon demonized drug use and addiction,59 declaring drug abuse 
as “public enemy number one.”60  In retrospect, President Nixon used the 
WOD as a means to punish his political dissidents61 and was not based on 
public health and safety concerns.62  The result of the WOD was an addition 
 
 52. Boggs Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (1951).  The Boggs Act of 1952 
amended the penalty provisions applicable to persons convicted of violating certain narcotic laws, 
such that a first federal offense conviction for marijuana possession carried a minimum sentence of 
two to ten years and a fine of up to $20,000. 
 53. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 567 (1956).  The Narcotics Control Act of 1956 
sought to reducing narcotics trafficking and use in the United States, by, inter alia, increasing the 
penalties and mandatory minimum prison sentences outlined by the Boggs Act of 1951 and 
introduced the death penalty for certain drug offenses. 
 54. See generally, CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1995), THEODORE 
ROSZAK, THE MAKING OF A COUNTER CULTURE (1968).   
 55. Id.  
 56. See generally, TONY PAYAN, A WAR THAT CAN’T BE WON (2013). 
 57. See CSA, supra note 4, which, inter alia, repealed the MTA.  
 58. See Reich, supra note 54.   
 59. See also, Emily, Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to 
Crime, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-
on-drugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319. 
 60. See Reich supra note 54 (stating that the term “War on Drugs” was popularized after 
President Richard Nixon’s press conference on June 18, 1971).   
 61. Top Nixon advisor John Ehrlichman later acknowledged the President’s political 
motivation behind the WOD:  
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that had two enemies: 
the antiwar left and black people.  You understand what I’m saying?  We knew we 
couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public 
to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing 
both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.  We could arrest their leaders, raid 
their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening 
news.  Did we know we were lying about the drugs?  Of course we did.  
Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S MAG. (Apr. 2016), https:// 
harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/, archived at https://perma.cc/W4S3-ASXS.  
 62. President Nixon viewed drug users as law-breaking hedonists that deserved to be 
punished, not because pot was harmful to society.  See Reich, supra note 54.  At the federal level, 
marijuana remains classified as a dangerous drug, despite science and popular opinion.  
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of fuel and more victims to segments of society that were already over-
policed.63 
During the 1980s, President Ronald W. Reagan accelerated the WOD.64  
During his administration, federal penalties for the cultivation, possession, 
or transfer of marijuana were increased,65 with harsher penalties and 
mandatory sentences with the enactments of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act (1984),66 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986),67 and the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Amendment Act (1988).68 
On the judicial front, the United States Supreme Court supported the 
WOD through its interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution.69  In two separate cases, United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Cooperative70 and Gonzales v. Raich,71 the Court ruled twice that 
the federal government has the right to regulate and criminalize marijuana, 
whether in medical or recreational use.72  Accordingly, federal laws that 
prohibit marijuana use and sale preempt State legalization laws.73 
 
 63. Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to Drugs, 11 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 386 (2017) (“an increase in sentence lengths [including harsh 
mandatory minimums], reaffirmation of the death penalty, an expansion of criminal offenses and a 
change in the stated purposes of corrections”). 
 64. See Michael McGrath, Nancy Reagan and the Negative Impact of the “Just Say No” Anti-
Drug Campaign, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/mar/08/ 
nancy-reagan-drugs-just-say-no-dare-program-opioid-epidemic.  
 65. Stephen R. Kandall, Substance and Shadow: Women and Addiction in the United States, 
235 (1996) (providing that “In 1992 more than 340,000 people were arrested . . . [b]y the middle 
of 1994 approximately four million arrests for marijuana violations had been recorded since the 
early 1980s”). 
 66. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 197 (1984) (establishing Sentencing Commission, which 
established mandatory sentencing guidelines). 
 67. Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (changing the system of federally supervised release 
from a rehabilitative system into a punitive system and enacting new mandatory minimum 
sentences for drugs, including marijuana). 
 68. Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (creating the policy goal of a drug-free America, 
establishing the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and requiring mandatory minimum 
penalties to drug trafficking conspiracies and attempted drug trafficking offenses).  
 69. Meaning that federal laws preempt conflicting State and local laws. 
 70. 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (rejecting the common-law medical necessity defense to crimes 
enacted under the federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970, regardless of their legal status under 
the laws of States such as California that recognize a medical use for marijuana). 
 71. 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (previously Ashcroft v. Raich) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
Controlled Substances Act, affirming that Congress has the power to regulate marijuana possession, 
sale, and cultivation was affirmed, and that, under Congress’ Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, Congress may criminalize the production and use of homegrown marijuana even if 
state law allows its use for medicinal purposes). 
 72. See supra note 69; see also, Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 73. See Gonzales, 545 U.S at 40 (explaining that it was impossible to distinguish between 
“controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate” and “controlled substances 
manufactured and distributed interstate,” because drugs like marijuana are fungible commodities, 
and that marijuana was only an instant away from entering the interstate market, whether or not it 
was legally obtained in a state that has passed marijuana reform). 
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The battle over the enforcement of the federal prohibition of marijuana 
has flip-flopped in the most recent two presidential administrations.74  
Following the 2012 reelection of President Barack H. Obama, his 
administration took a careful, painfully slow approach to assessing its past 
policy goals relative to drug regulations.75  Then, on August 29, 2013, the 
United States Department of Justice announced a bold, hands-off policy, 
known as the “Cole Memorandum,” which specified that the commercial 
distribution of cannabis would generally be tolerated, unless violence or 
firearms were involved, the proceeds went to gangs and cartels, or it was 
distributed to states where it was illegal.76  This policy continued throughout 
the balance of the second term of the Obama administration. 
In 2016, Donald J. Trump was elected as the 45th President, along with 
a Republican Party control of the Congress, with the expectation that the new 
leadership would reassess the federal enforcement of marijuana 
regulations.77  Some expected that the new administration would challenge 
the Obama administration’s tolerance of State legalization of marijuana with 
minimal federal roadblocks.78  As predicted, on January 4, 2018, the Donald 
J. Trump administration, under then United States Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, rescinded the Cole Memorandum and issued an updated 
memorandum instructing U.S. Attorneys to enforce the federal law 
prohibiting marijuana.79  As such, Attorney General Sessions granted more 
discretion to federal prosecutors, allowing them to “use previously 
established prosecutorial principles that provide them all the necessary tools 
to disrupt criminal organizations, tackle the growing drug crisis, and thwart 
violent crime across our country.”80  The stated purpose of the guidance was 
to allow federal prosecutors to decide whether to crack down on marijuana 
businesses in States where the substance is legal, for recreational use.81  
Despite these stated federal policies, states and municipalities have 
 
 74. Namely, the Obama and Trump administrations. 
 75. The White House, Obama Administration Releases 21st Century Drug Policy Strategy 
(Apr. 17, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/news-releases-remarks/obama-adm 
inistration-releases-21st-century-drug-policy-strategy (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
 76. Memorandum for All United States Attorneys: Guidance Regarding Federal Marijuana 
Enforcement, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice. 
gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.  
 77. See generally, German Lopez, The Trump Administration’s New War on Marijuana, 
Explained, VOX (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/4/16849866/ 
marijuana-legalization-trump-sessions-cole-memo. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  “This is going to create chaos . . .  If enforcement of laws are (sic) subject to the whims 
of individual prosecutors, no one will have any idea what is legal or what isn’t—because it could 
change from day to day.”  Id. 
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continued to legalize marijuana, both for recreational and medicinal use, and 
the Trump Administration has not stood in their way.82 
2. The WOD Has Failed.83 
Despite its federal support for many years, the WOD has failed to 
achieve its stated goal to reduce the use of drugs, for several reasons.  First, 
the WOD has not mitigated the use of marijuana.84  Second, the WOD 
created a major drain on law enforcement resources.85  According to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s annual Uniform Crime Report, there have 
been over twelve million cannabis arrests in the United States since 1996, 
including 749,825 arrests for marijuana violations in 2012.86  As a result, by 
requiring police officers to pursue pot users, the WOD has diverted police 
attention from serious violent crimes.87  Third, the WOD has been expensive; 
it is estimated to cost the United States fifty-one billion dollars each year.88 
 
 82. Joseph Misulonas, These Charts Show the Evolution of America’s Marijuana Laws over 
Time, CIVILIZED (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.civilized.life/articles/evolution-america-marijuana-
laws-charts (providing various charts that demonstrate the exponential growth of marijuana reform 
in the United States and the inevitability of a federal level change). 
 83. See generally, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY, WAR ON DRUGS (June 2011), 
https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/56924096 (declaring: “The global war on drugs has failed, with 
devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world . . . fundamental reforms 
in national and global drug control policies are urgently needed.”). 
 84. Marijuana is the most widely used illicit drug in both the United States and the world. See 
Drug Facts: Marijuana, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG ABUSE (Feb. 2018), https://www.druga 
buse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana.  Furthermore, an estimated twenty-two million people 
have used marijuana in a past month. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Results from the 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables, https:// 
www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015/NSDUH-DetTabs-
2015/NSDUH- DetTabs-2015.htm.   
 85.  Brian Stauffer, Every 25 Seconds: The Human Toll of Criminalizing Drug Use in the 
United States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/ 
12/every-25-seconds/human-toll-criminalizing-drug-use-united-states (noting that every twenty-
five seconds within the United States, a person is arrested for simply possessing marijuana for their 
personal use).  Marijuana arrests comprise of almost one-half (48.3 percent) of all drug arrests 
reported in the United States.  According to the American Civil Liberties Union, there were 8.2 
million marijuana arrests from 2001 to 2010, and 88 percent of those arrests were just for the 
possession of marijuana.  Id. 
 86. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, BEAU KILMER, MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW? (2016). 
 87. Christopher Ingraham, Police Arrest More People for Marijuana Use than for all Violent 
Crimes—Combined, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
wp/2016/10/12/police-arrest-more-people-for-marijuana-use-than-for-all-violent-crimes-combi 
ned (stating “at least 137,000 people sit behind bars on simple drug-possession charges, according 
to a report released Wednesday by the American Civil Liberties Union and Human Rights Watch”).  
 88.  See supra note 15; see also, Common Sense for Drug Policy, Drug War Policy, 
https://www.drugwarfacts.org/ (last visited July 17, 2019).   
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Fourth, the WOD has produced a disparate impact on people of color.  
While marijuana use is roughly equal among Blacks89 and whites, Blacks are 
nearly four times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession.90  
Further, although whites, Blacks, and Latinos use and sell drugs at similar 
rates, fifty-seven percent of the people incarcerated in state prison for drug 
offenses are Black or Latino.91  Unfortunately, the criminalization of 
marijuana use has facilitated the government’s harassment of racial 
minorities92 and has disproportionally damaged minority communities.93  
Despite the fact that marijuana use was not always associated with people of 
color,94 the criminalization of marijuana has been founded on racism and 
 
 89. The author has chosen to use the capitalized adjective “Black” to refer to Americans of 
the African diaspora and “Latino” to refer to Americans of Hispanic descent, while using the 
lowercased adjective “white” to refer to Americans of European ancestry.  See Lori L. Tharps, The 
Case for Black with a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-for-black-with-a-capital-b.html, archived at https://perma.cc/SA U7-
63XJ (last visited July 22, 2019).  
 90. See Drug War Statistics, supra note 15 (“In the 39 states for which we have sufficient 
police data, Black adults were more than four times as likely to be arrested for marijuana possession 
as white adults.”  (Footnotes omitted.)).  See also, supra note 20, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN 
BLACK AND WHITE; Alex Burnes, Colorado Could Move to Clear Pre-Legalization Marijuana 
Convictions Statewide as soon as 2019, Black and Hispanic Coloradans Have been 
Disproportionately Burdened by Marijuana-Related Arrests, COLORADO INDEPENDENT (Dec. 6, 
2018), https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2018/12/06/colorado-marijuana-convictions-2019/ 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2019).   
 91. See Drug War Statistics, supra note 15. There is historical evidence showing that a 
significant reason for the marijuana ban by the U.S. government was political and racist in nature, 
aimed to suppress Black and Mexican minorities.  See also, L. M. VAN HET LOO ET AL., CANNABIS 
POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES (2003) (stating that statistics show that controlling 
cannabis use leads in many cases to selective law enforcement, which increases the chances of 
arresting people from certain ethnicities.  For example, while Blacks and Hispanics constitute about 
twenty percent of cannabis users in the United States, they accounted for fifty-eight percent of 
cannabis offenders sentenced under federal law in 1994).  
 92. Similarly, the prohibition of alcohol facilitated the rise of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as a national police force.  See generally, infra Part III.   
 93. See Bender, supra note 22; Short, supra note 23. 
 94. See generally, Caulkins, supra note 86; MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY (2005); 
ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS (2003) (detailing the history of marijuana laws in the United 
States); Dr. Malik Burnett & Amanda Reiman, How Did Marijuana Become Illegal in the First 
Place?, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.drugpolicy.org/blog/how-did-mariju 
ana-become-illegal-first-place (last visited Aug. 4, 2019).  
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xenophobia.95  As a result, one scholar has referred to the WOD as a “war on 
people of color,”96 with particular harm suffered by the Black community.97 
Fifth, the WOD has negatively impacted research of the medicinal 
benefits of marijuana.  In fact, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration has prohibited the research and use of marijuana as 
medicine.98  Despite this probation, in 2015 Congress, by approving the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment,99 sought to restrict federal raids, arrests, and 
criminal prosecutions of medical marijuana activities, by prohibiting the 
Justice Department from using funds to prevent state implementation of 
medical marijuana laws.100 
Sixth, the WOD is eroding with the federal government’s repeal of the 
prohibition of the industrial use of cannabis for Hemp.101  Originally, Hemp 
 
 95. See generally, NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A 
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 16 (1972); WILLIAM O. WALKER, DRUGS IN THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE: AN ODYSSEY OF CULTURES IN CONFLICT, 45 (1996). 
 96. See generally, David McDonald, The Racist Roots of Marijuana Prohibition, 
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC FREEDOM (Apr. 11, 2017), https://fee.org/articles/the-racist-roots-
of-marijuana-prohibition/. 
 97. See Short, supra note 23.  Even with the legalization of pot, Blacks are more susceptible 
to being arrested for marijuana sale or possession than are whites.  See, e.g., Drug Policy Alliance, 
From Prohibition to Progress: A Status Report on Marijuana Legalization (Jan. 2018), http:// 
www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_marijuana_legalization_report_feb14_2018_0.pdf# 
page=7.   
 98. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE on DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE (July 2019), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana-medicine. 
 99. See Amendment Text: H. Amdt.748 — 113th Congress (2013–2014), https://www.con 
gress.gov/amendment/113th-congress/house-amendment/748/text (last visited Aug. 13, 2019) and 
has been reenacted every year to date.  Initially, the DOJ narrowly interpreted the Amendment to 
only apply to limit enforcement against state officials.  See also, United States v. McIntosh, 833 
F.3d 1163 (2016) (the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejecting the DOJ’s restrictive reading 
of the Amendment, in a case consolidating the appeals of ten medical cannabis providers in the 
states of California and Washington, in a unanimous ruling of the three-judge panel).  
 100. See Harris, supra note 76.  
 101. Marijuana Moment, Hemp is Officially Legalized with President Trump’s Signature on 
Farm Bill, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/marijuana/ 
2018/12/20/hemp-officially-legalized-with-president-trump-signature-farm-bill/aKmNr3iS2AVJu 
RUbLPnz6I/story.html.  The distinction between Cannabis, Cannabinoids (hereinafter “CBD”), 
and Hemp can be confusing.  See Spencer Jakab, The Verdict on CBD Is . . . Confusing, WALL ST. 
J. (June 4, 2019) (reporting that a leading cannabis exchange-traded fund fell by a little over five 
percent and then rebounded following a United States Food and Drug Administration hearing on 
hearing on CBD), available at https://www. wsj.com/articles/the-verdict-on-cbd-is-confusing-
11559685073 (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).  Throughout the United States, CBD, a non-psychoactive 
component of cannabis, is widely marketed for medicinal purposes.  See generally, NCSL, State 
Medical Marijuana Laws, http:// www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx 
(last visited July 22, 2019).  In December 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed into law the 
2018 Farm Bill, which declassified hemp as no longer a Schedule 1 drug and legalized the growth 
of hemp by licensed growers.  As a result, hemp-derived CBD is no longer federally prohibited, 
while CBD derived from marijuana is prohibited at the federal level.  See John Hudak, The Farm 
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was illegal to grow without a permit under the CSA, due to its relation to 
cannabis, and because it was an imported product, there was a zero-tolerance 
policy.102  However, on December 20, 2018, President Trump signed the 
2018 United States Farm Bill, which de-scheduled Hemp, making cannabis 
plants that contain less than 0.3% THC legal.103  This action on the part of 
the Trump Administration sends a strong signal that the WOD, at least 
relative to marijuana, may be coming to an end.104 
In summary, the legalization of marijuana should be reviewed within 
the context of the WOD and its failures.  Legalization also reflects the need 
to address the shortcomings of the criminal justice system, such as the need 
to make jails and prisons more humane and to reduce the high costs of 
incarceration.105  Furthermore, States that have legalized marijuana receive 
a new tax revenue stream, resulting from licensed marijuana sales.106  
However, when a State legalizes marijuana, it creates two groups of pot 
users: those who are legally permitted to smoke or consume weed today, and 
those who now have criminal records and are in prison, because they smoked 
or consumed it in the past.  This discrepancy in the classification of 
criminality, based solely upon when the activity occurred in time, raises an 
issue of equal justice and demands a review of the laws of retroactivity.107 
B. Retroactivity is Not Guaranteed. 
The foregoing history of the WOD leads to a new chapter in the 
regulation of marijuana, namely, the legalization at the state level.  This 
section analyzes whether marijuana legalization laws apply retroactively to 
past pot offenders.  It begins with a review of retroactivity rules, as currently 
applied in the United States when newly enacted laws reduce or eliminate 
(diminishes) criminal culpability standards.  As will be examined in detail, 
 
Bill, Hemp Legalization and the Status of CBD: An Explainer, BROOKINGS (Dec. 14, 2018), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/ 2018/12/14/the-farm-bill-hemp-and-cbd-explainer/.  
 102. FRANK J. HOUSE, AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, TERMS AND LAWS 146 (2006). 
 103. See Marijuana Moment, supra note 97. 
 104. See Marianne Levine, Gardner: Trump Said He Would Sign Pot Bill, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/04/cory-gardner-trump-marijuana-bill-1255762. 
 105. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE 
AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION (Nov. 2007), http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/srs/ 
UnlockingAmerica.pdf (stating that the U.S. spends an estimated $68 billion per year on 
incarceration, with a sixth of those numbers as marijuana drug related offenses.  A reduction in the 
prison population due to decriminalizing marijuana could save an average of $11.3 billion per year 
on courts, police, prison guards and other related expenses.). 
 106. See Jon Gettman, Marijuana Production in the United States, BULLETIN OF CANNABIS 
REFORM (2006) (reporting that marijuana is the top cash crop in twelve states, is one of the top 
three cash crops in thirty states, and is one of the top five cash crops in thirty-nine states, and 
estimating the value of U.S. pot production at 35.8 billion dollars, which is more than the combined 
value of corn and wheat).  
 107. See supra note 46.  
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in the U.S., such laws apply retroactively only when the legislation expressly 
provides for such.  However, they do not apply retroactively when the 
legislation is silent as to retroactivity.108  This second rule of retroactivity, 
when the law is silent, conflicts with most jurisdictions around the world, 
which adopt the position that when a new criminal law diminishes criminal 
culpability, the new, diminished standard automatically applies 
retroactively.109 
Even when retroactivity is explicitly provided for in newly enacted 
laws, such laws seldom spell out the specifics as to how and when 
retroactivity applies.110  For example, while California’s legalization laws 
expressly provided for retroactivity, it continues to struggle with the depth 
and scope of the relief.111  Next, to better understand how retroactivity rules 
apply in the case of marijuana legalization, I will discuss two legal sources 
of criminal legalization: legislative laws and executive laws.  These and other 
sources of laws show how retroactivity rules are often inconsistent. 
1. Legislative Laws 
State criminal laws are “legislative,” that is, enacted at the state level 
by the legislature and signed into law by the governor.112  For purposes of 
this Article, such legislative laws will be organized into two categories.  The 
first is comprised of laws that define and punish new criminal behavior, 
called “new crimes.”  The second is composed of laws that eliminate or 
lessen past crimes, called “reform laws.”  The legalization of marijuana falls 
into the reform law category.  However, regardless of the category, all 
criminal laws require an effective date of enforcement. 
Both types of legislative laws, new crimes and reform laws, are meant 
to apply prospectively, and become effective sometime in the future, after 
 
 108. See generally, University of San Francisco School of Law, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. 
SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 65-73 (May 2013), Section II, D. Retroactive 
Application of Ameliorative Law (analyzing retroactive amelioration on a global scale and 
concluding that the United States is one of few countries to not expressly grant this right to its 
citizens).   
 109. See generally, id. (concluding the global reality is that most countries consider positive 
retroactive application of a change in law to be a basic and fundamental right). 
 110. See, e.g., California Proposition 64, supra note 4; (full text available at https:// 
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB64); supra note 8; see 
also, Lee Gaines, How Do You Clear a Pot Conviction From Your Record?, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/27/how-do-you-clear-a-
pot-conviction-from-your-record.  
 111. See infra, Part I, C.; California Proposition 64, supra note 4; (full text available at 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB64). 
 112. See Criminal Law: 1.6 Sources of Law, ER SERVICES, https://courses.lumenlearning.co 
m/suny-criminallaw/chapter/1-6-sources-of-law/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
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being signed into law.113  While most are meant to continue for an indefinite 
period; a few are deemed to “sunset,” that is, terminate on a given, set 
timetable.114 
Contrary to prospective application, not all new legislative criminal 
laws are meant to apply retroactively.  For example, a criminal law, called a 
“new crime,” that applies retroactively to criminally punish past behavior or 
activity is an ex post facto law,115 and is expressly prohibited by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution (hereinafter the “Clause”).116  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has found that this Clause does not 
constitute an absolute bar against criminal ex post facto laws.117  For 
example, in Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court upheld Alaska’s “Megan’s 
Law” that required sex offenders to register with local police, to thereafter 
provide for public notifications via the Internet.118  The Court determined 
that the legislative intent was civil and non-punitive.119  Hence, the law did 
not violate the ex post facto prohibition.120  Therefore, not all laws with 
retroactive effects are held to be unconstitutional.121 
Most importantly, as the legalization of marijuana is a type of reform 
law, the focus shifts to how the retroactivity rules relate to these types of 
laws as opposed to “new crime” laws.  The issue of retroactivity becomes 
less clear when a new law lessens or eliminates criminal liability.  For 
example, a new marijuana law might provide that an adult can possess and 
consume a limited amount of marijuana for their personal use, regardless of 
 
 113. CONGRESS.GOV, Enactment of a Law - Learn About the Legislative Process, https://www. 
congress.gov/resources/display/content/Enactment+of+a+Law+-+Learn+About+the+LegislAtive 
+Process (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).  
 114. Sunset Provision Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://111definitions.uslegal 
.com/s/sunset-provision/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
 115. See Cornell Law School, Ex Post Facto, Legal Information Institute https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/ex_post_facto (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).  See also, infra Part III.  
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post fact Law, or 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).  These provisions, though actually comprised of 
two separate clauses, will be referred as the “Ex Post Facto Clause” or the “Clause.”  See also, infra 
Part III. 
 117. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  Not all laws with retroactive, negative effects are 
unconstitutional.  See also, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, 120 Stat 587 (2006) (imposing imposes new registration requirements on convicted sex 
offenders and applying to offenders whose crimes were committed before the law was enacted). 
 118. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 98-99.  
 119. Id. at 105-106 (holding the Act “establish[ed] a civil regulatory scheme.  The Act is 
nonpunitive, and its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”). 
 120. Id. at 106. 
 121. See generally, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  See also, U.S. Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 (2012) (stating the rules as they relate to the effects of ex post facto).  
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the purpose.122  This modifies the old marijuana rule which expressly 
prohibited any such possession and use.123  If said change results from a 
legislative law and that law is silent as to retroactivity, a past offender would 
not be exonerated for the same activity that is now no longer illegal.124 
Unlike ex post facto laws that punish past behavior, there is no 
constitutional prohibition against a reform law applying retroactively to 
exonerate or lessen past criminal behavior or activity.125  As a result, 
legislative laws are permitted to apply retroactively.126 
As there is no constitutional prohibition, such laws apply retroactively, 
when the legislation in and of itself explicitly provides.127  On the other hand, 
it appears that legislative laws do not apply retroactively, when the 
legislative law is either silent or when it expressly states that it does not apply 
retroactively.128 
Another problem that exists with the retroactivity of legislative laws is 
the “separation of powers” features of the Constitution.129  This means 
 
 122. See J. Richard Couzens & Tricia A. Bigelow, Proposition 64: “Adult Use of Marijuana 
Act” Resentencing Procedures and Other Selected Provisions (Nov. 2016), http://www.courts. 
ca.gov/documents/prop64-Memo-20161110.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).  
 123. Id. 
 124. See Mikos, Zezima, supra note 28.  See also, Berman, supra note 28 (noting “[s]ome 
limits on the reach of ameliorative efforts are formalized in the laws providing for record sealing 
or expungement: many statutes that create or expand expungement or sealing mechanisms still 
often place significant waiting periods before any remedy is available to an ex-offender or limit 
relief to the lowest level of offenders and offenses.”). 
 125. See Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States 
of America (3d ed. 1900); The New International Encyclopædia, supra note 111. 
 126. Cooley, supra note 125. 
 127. See S.B. 5605, 66 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2019) http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/ 
biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5605.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2019).  Sec. 1. RCW 
9.96.060 and 2017 c 336 s 2, 2017 c 272 s 9, and 5 2017 c 128 s 1 are each reenacted and amended 
to read as follows:  
(1) Every person convicted of a misdemeanor marijuana offense under RCW 
69.50.4014, who was twenty-one years of age or older at the time of the offense, may 
apply to the sentencing court for a vacation of the applicant’s record of conviction for 
the offense. The court shall vacate the record of conviction by: (a)(i) Permitting the 
applicant to withdraw the applicant’s plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty; or 
(ii) if the applicant has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court setting aside 
the verdict of guilty; and (b) the court dismissing the information, indictment, complaint, 
or citation against the applicant and vacating the judgment and sentence.  
H.B. 1438, Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act (2019), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/ 
101/PDF/101-0027.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
 128. See generally, University of San Francisco School of Law, supra note 108. 
 129. See Harold J. Krent, Retroactivity and Crack Sentencing Reform (April 26, 2013) 
(Chicago-Kent College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-19) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2257086 
(last visited July 22, 2019) (analyzing, inter alia, “two separation of powers concerns that might 
justify a rule against retroactive application of congressional leniency: first, whether Congress’s 
reduction of sentences would interfere with the President’s pardon authority under Article II, and 
second, whether Congress lacks the power to undo a final decision of the judiciary.”  And 
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legislative laws may be subject to judicial review, which could overturn the 
retroactive application of the newly enacted laws.130  As will be discussed 
later, such legislative laws would be invalid if they wrongfully infringe on 
the constitutional rights of a past offender.131 
2. Executive Laws 
In addition to retroactivity relating to the legislative legalization of 
marijuana, there is another source of law that could support a case for 
retroactive amelioration.  These are Executive Orders or actions of the 
President or the Governor at the State level, called “executive laws,” such as 
clemency. 
Clemency,132 granted by the President or a State governor, is another 
way to obtain relief for a past offense.133  Clemency includes the power to 
pardon134 which works differently from legalization by way of legislative 
laws.  Rather than redefining the relevant acts as noncriminal, a pardon may 
simply prohibit the prosecution of, or may release, a person that is already 
incarcerated.135  However, this is an incomplete remedy, as it leaves the 
underlying conviction technically unaltered.136  In fact, as a condition of 
 
concluding “[t]here were no constitutional obstacles preventing Congress from benefiting those 
previously convicted of trafficking crack.”). 
 130. Couzens & Bigelow, supra note 118. 
 131. See infra Part III. 
 132. See U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (The President “shall have power to grant reprises and 
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”).  See also, P.S. 
Ruckman, Jr., Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins, Development, and Analysis (1900-
1993), 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 251 (1997) (concluding that the Supreme Court has 
held this includes the power to grant pardons, conditional pardons, commutations of sentences, 
remissions of fines and forfeiture, respites, and amnesties). 
 133. Id.  
 134. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 98-99; See also, Janet Portman, Presidential Clemency: 
Pardons, Commutations, and Reprieves, NOLO, https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/ 
resources/presidential-clemency-pardons-commutations-and-reprie (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
 135. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARDON INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS, https://www. 
justice.gov/pardon/pardon-information-and-instructions (last visited Aug. 8, 2019): 
While a presidential pardon will restore various rights lost as a result of the pardoned 
offense and should lessen to some extent the stigma arising from a conviction, it will 
not erase or expunge the record of your conviction.  Therefore, even if you are granted 
a pardon, you must still disclose your conviction on any form where such information 
is required, although you may also disclose the fact that you received a pardon.  In 
addition, most civil disabilities attendant upon a federal felony conviction, such as loss 
of the right to vote and hold state public office, are imposed by state rather than federal 
law, and also may be removed by state action.  Because the federal pardon process is 
exacting and may be more time-consuming than analogous state procedures, you may 
wish to consult with the appropriate authorities in the state of your residence regarding 
the procedures for restoring your state civil rights.  
 136. Id.   
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receiving a pardon, the recipient must admit that the crime did take place.137  
Additionally, pardons are rare and are usually granted on an individual, 
specific case-by-case basis.138  While pardons are usually granted to 
individuals, a President or a Governor can issue a blanket, unconditional 
pardon or amnesty to apply to an entire group of people.139  As will be 
discussed in the next section, the Governors of Washington and Illinois are 
aggressively using the power to pardon as a means to provide retroactive 
amelioration to past pot offenders.140 
Hence, an analysis of the executive laws on retroactivity leads to the 
observation that while pardons support the concept of exoneration, they do 
not guarantee retroactive amelioration. Additionally, pardons are limited in 
both scope and application.  That is, executive pardons usually apply to 
individuals, rather than groups, and provide only forgiveness, rather than the 
complete exoneration for a past offense.  As a result, such executive laws are 
ill-suited to address the needs of past pot offenders. 
In summary, relative to retroactive amelioration, neither legislative nor 
executive laws guarantee retroactivity, and, even when retroactive relief is 
expressly granted, such laws fail to define the scope of relief.  Hence, the 
rules of retroactivity have a shortcoming: for legislative laws, the rules focus 
on the intention of the legislature, rather than the rights of the past offender.  
Furthermore, the legislative rules may not apply to most marijuana 
legalization laws, as they have resulted from statewide referendums.141  For 
executive rules, retroactivity does not mean exoneration.  Yet, this is only 
part of the problem, because, even when legalization laws expressly provide 
for retroactivity, the amelioration they grant is both superficial and 
inconsistent, as will be shown next. 
 
 137. Supra note 135.  (Noting “. . . a presidential pardon is ordinarily a sign of forgiveness and 
is granted in recognition of the applicant’s acceptance of responsibility for the crime and established 
good conduct for a significant period of time after conviction or release . . . .”). 
 138. Id.  See also, Tom Murse, Number of Pardons by President, THOUGHT CO. (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/number-of-pardons-by-president-3367600 (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
 139. See, e.g., Andrew Glass, Carter Pardons Draft Dodgers January 21, 1977, POLITICO (Jan. 
21, 2008, 3:56 AM) (Then President Jimmy Carter granted amnesty to Vietnam War draft dodgers 
who had fled the United States to Canada.), https://www.politico.com/story/2008/01/car ter-
pardons-draft-dodgers-jan-21-1977-007974 (last visited Aug. 13, 2019); President Johnson’s 
Amnesty Proclamation, https://www.nytimes.com/1865/05/30/archives/president-johnsons-amn 
esty-proclamation-restoration-to-rights-of.html (last visited July 22, 2019); JONATHAN TRUMAN 
DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON, THE RESTORATION OF THE 
CONFEDERATES TO THEIR RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES, 1861-1898 (1953).  
 140. See infra Part I.  
 141. See Marijuana Moment, supra note 7. 
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C. Retroactivity Does Not Mean Exoneration. 
It is critical for past pot offenders to know if and how the legalization 
of marijuana exonerates their past offenses.  Some of them face the most 
severe effect of a marijuana conviction, life in prison without the possibility 
of parole.142  They need the most immediate, certain relief to address over-
sentencing and the right to be released.143  Nonetheless, all past pot offenders 
need comprehensive remedies to reflect the new standard of criminal 
culpability.  To assess whether States are meeting the needs of past offenders, 
this Section analyzes the various approaches to retroactive amelioration for 
past pot offenders following legalization.144  Specifically, it will review 
whether a State has expressly provided for retroactivity in its legalization 
laws, analyze the scope of the retroactivity when it is expressly provided for, 
and discuss illustrations of retroactive amelioration initiatives.  Most 
notably, it will analyze the retroactivity issue from five criteria, seriatim: 1) 
certain, automatic, immediate, and inexpensive relief; 2) remediation of 
negative, collateral consequences of arrests or convictions; 3) post-
conviction remedies; 4) reparations of communities devastated by the WOD; 
and 5) exoneration based upon past offenders’ constitutional rights, rather 
than from the arbitrary grant of privilege by the government. 
1. Certain, Automatic, Immediate, and Inexpensive Relief 
Currently, California,145 Illinois,146 Oregon,147 and Washington148 have 
expressly provided for retroactive ameliorative relief in their marijuana 
 
 142. See Couzens & Bigelow, supra note 112; See also, Drug Policy Alliance, It’s Not Legal 
Yet: Nearly 500,000 Marijuana Arrests in California in the Last Decade (Aug. 17, 2016), 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2016/08/its-not-legal-yet-nearly-500000-marijuana-arrests-cali 
fornia-last-decade (last visited July 31, 2019) (noting that despite California’s more permissive 
marijuana possession laws, the state had 465,873 marijuana arrests between 2006 and 2015 and on 
average 14,000 marijuana felony arrests each year (this number dropped by a third to 8,866 in 
2015); Bryan Schatz, Waiting to Die in Prison—for Selling a Couple Bags of Pot, MOTHER JONES 
(2015), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/life-sentence-marijuana-pot-prison-comm 
uted/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“Federal judges have sentenced 54 people to life without parole 
for marijuana crimes since 1996.”). 
 143. See Berman, supra note 28. 
 144. This is a select sampling of legalization laws and not meant to be representative of all such 
laws.  
 145. Section 11361.8 is added to the Health and Safety Code.  Olson, Hagel and Fishburn LLP, 
Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, 52-55; 58-60 (2016), https://www.oag.ca. 
gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0103%20(Marijuana)_1.pdf (last visited July 24, 2019).   
 146. See H.B. 1438, supra note 124 (providing, inter alia, for expungement of marijuana 
offenses and defining “expunge” to mean to “physically destroy the records or return them to the 
petitioner and to obliterate the petitioner’s name from any official index or public record, or both.”). 
 147. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (2016) (uncodified provision § 129); H.B. 1438, supra 
note 124. 
 148. See S.B. 5605, supra note 126. 
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reform laws—by providing for the possibility of a revised sentence and/or 
expungement of a criminal record.149 
However, even when a State has an aggressive approach to retroactive 
amelioration, the relief made available does not satisfy the needs of past 
offenders for several reasons.  First, the relief does not provide certainty or 
consistency.  For example, misdemeanor charges are treated differently from 
felony changes.  In 2018, former San Francisco District Attorney, George 
Gascón, announced that without petitions, he will dismiss and seal more than 
three thousand misdemeanor marijuana convictions in San Francisco dating 
back to 1975; yet, relative to pot-related felony cases, less than two dozen 
people in San Francisco filed for expungement.150  Additionally, there is no 
guaranteed consistency from one county to another.  For example, in April 
2019, prosecutors in Los Angeles and San Joaquin counties announced their 
plans to automatically clear approximately fifty-four thousand marijuana-
related convictions.151  Yet, it is unclear whether other jurisdictions in the 
State of California have or will respond to the new laws in a consistently 
acted, if at all.152  Second, even with retroactivity, such as in California, the 
laws produce uncertainty, as they do not designate how far back in time the 
new laws shall apply.153  Whether the new laws apply retroactivity for ten 
years, twenty years, or longer is not clear. 
Third, even when legalization laws provide for retroactivity, such as in 
California, the process is cumbersome, as it often requires a past offender to 
actively apply for relief.154  This can be both time consuming and 
 
 149. See supra notes 145-8; Kyle Jaeger, States That Legalize Marijuana Need to Do This Too, 
ATTN.COM (Nov. 23, 2016) https://www.attn.com/stories/13022/the-one-law-all-states-with-
legal-marijuana-need (providing a useful link to The Orange County Register, showing the 
difference in marijuana-related penalties under California’s new law, at https://www.ocregis 
ter.com/2016/11/07/if-prop-64-passes-what-happens-to-prisoners-convicted-of-marijuana-
charges/).  
 150. See also, Evan Sernoffsky, SF Will Wipe Thousands of Marijuana Convictions off the 
Books, SFGATE.COM (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SF-will-wipe-thousands-
of-marijuana-convictions-12540550.php (last visited July 24, 2019); see also, Press Release, News 
from the Office of District Attorney George Gascón, District Attorney George Gascón Applies 
Proposition 64 Retroactively to Every Marijuana Case Since 1975 (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://sfdistrictattorney.org/district-attorney-george-gasc%C3%B3n-applies-proposition-64-retro 
actively-every-marijuana-case-1975 (last visited July 24, 2019).   
 151. See Alene Tchekmedyian, Prosecutors Move to Clear 54,000 Marijuana Convictions in 
California, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-la-county-
marijuana-convictions-20190401-story.html (last visited July 24, 2019). 
 152. See Mikos, supra note 29. 
 153. See Sernoffsky, supra note 147. 
 154. See Zezima, supra note 28 (stating that “[i]n most places, people must specifically request 
to have their records expunged, a process that can be costly and time-consuming.  Though the laws 
largely aimed to help low-income people, there is concern that the petitioning process makes it 
more difficult, and therefore less likely, that they will move to have their records changed.”). 
A - CRUSTO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:34 AM 
390 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:3 
expensive.155  California recognized the need to expedite its retroactive 
amelioration of past offenders and enacted additional laws to facilitate some 
relief.156 However, even under the new laws, applying for retroactive relief 
does not ensure such relief will be granted.157 Some of the uncertainty relates 
to the fact that not every case of a criminal offense is the same.  In one case, 
the record of a marijuana conviction might have resulted from a plea bargain 
of a more severe charge. 
Fourth, retroactivity only applies in the jurisdiction that has legalized 
marijuana, and it does not apply to a federal marijuana-related offense, since 
the drug is still criminally proscribed at the federal level.  The result is that 
one major goal of marijuana reform, redressing the injustices of the WOD is 
failing. 
Fifth, the same problems occur when a Governor uses the pardon 
power, as in Washington.158  A past offender looking to the pardoning power 
for relief faces an additional problem, in that it merely excuses, but does not 
fully exonerate, a past offender. 
Observation #1: The legalization laws fail to provide past offenders 
with certain, automatic, immediate, and inexpensive exoneration of past 
offenses. 
 
 155. Id.  
 156. California Assem. Bill 1793, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), https://leginfo.legisla 
ture.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1793; see Lindsay Schnell, 
Marijuana Reform: New California Law Gives People with Records a Do-Over, USA TODAY (Oct. 
1, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/30/california-passes-landmark-marijua 
na-law-residents-reclaim-lives/1340729002/ (reporting that Assembly Bill 1793 was signed into 
law by Gov. Jerry Brown and will streamline a previously tedious process that made it difficult for 
residents with a prior pot-related conviction to clear their names). 
 157. See Lee Gaines, How Do You Clear a Pot Conviction from Your Record?, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/27/how- do-you-clear-a-
pot-conviction-from-your-record (last visited July 31, 2019). 
 158. On May 13, 2019, Governor Jay Inslee signed SB 5605, Concerning Marijuana Offense 
Convictions, https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5605&Chamber=Senate&Year= 
2019 (last visited July 3, 2019).  As of July 28, 2019, every person convicted of misdemeanor 
marijuana possession offenses in Washington, who was 21 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense, may apply to the sentencing court to vacate his or her conviction record for the marijuana 
offense.  Id.  In order to expedite the impact of the new law, Governor Inslee issued the Marijuana 
Justice Initiative, https://www.governor.wa.gov/marijuanajustice (last visited July 3, 2019): 
Under this Initiative, Inslee will exercise his constitutional clemency authority to 
pardon individuals who have a single conviction on their criminal record. That sole 
conviction must be for adult (21+) misdemeanor marijuana possession, prosecuted 
under state law in Washington. The conviction must have occurred between January 1, 
1998 and December 5, 2012, when I-502 legalized marijuana possession. Records 
indicate that roughly 3,500 individuals are eligible under this Initiative.  
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2. Remediation of Negative, Collateral Impacts 
The past marijuana laws have negative, collateral consequences159 on a 
large number of offenders.160  For example, over two hundred thousand 
students have lost federal financial aid eligibility because of drug 
convictions.161  Other collateral consequences of marijuana offenses include 
negative impacts on employment,162 professional licensing,163 
immigration,164 travel,165 and governmental benefits.166  Unfortunately, past 
(and some current) marijuana laws have created a second-class tier of 
 
 159. See supra note 14.  
 160. See infra Part I, on how the legalization laws fail to remediate collateral consequences for 
past offenders.  
 161. See Drug War Statistics, supra note 15 (because of a “drug” conviction, including pot). 
 162. See Marijuana Policy Project, supra note 14. 
 163. See, e.g., CAROLINE COHN, ET AL., STANFORD CENTER ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND 
STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, UNLOCKING THE BAR: EXPANDING ACCESS TO THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION (identifying a range of successive obstacles to becoming a lawyer in California 
and recommending ways for each of these barriers to be overcome to expand access to the legal 
profession for qualified people with criminal records).   
 164. Latinos and other immigrants experience detrimental immigration consequences for 
marijuana possession and other drug offenses.  For example, simple possession offenses are 
grounds for deportation of noncitizens under the Immigration and Nationality Act, unless they fall 
under the exception for single offense possession of small amounts of marijuana.  See Jordan 
Cunnings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and 
Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 531-35 (2015) (discussing how this 
personal-use exception can be lost by more than one marijuana offense, or by a conviction for social 
sharing of marijuana; also noting that there is no personal-use exception when noncitizens who 
travel abroad attempt to return to the United States).  See generally, Kevin R. Johnson, Racial 
Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967 (2015) (addressing how racial profiling of minority 
noncitizens adds to the treacherous immigration law impact of drug offenses); GRACE MENG, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH, A PRICE TOO HIGH: US FAMILIES TORN APART BY DEPORTATIONS FOR DRUG 
OFFENSES (June 16, 2015) (discussing the rise in drug deportations and the consequent impact on 
families).  See also, Tom Angell, New Cory Booker Bill Would Protect Immigrants from being 
Deported for Marijuana, FORBES (June 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites /tomangell/2019 
/06/27/new-cory-booker-bill-would-protect-immigrants-from-being-deported-for-marijuana/#46 
4b663f5dbe (noting that “[u]nder current law, more than 34,000 immigrants were deported for 
cannabis possession between 2007 and 2012, according to a Human Rights Watch reportFalse” and 
reporting that “In April, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services issued a memo clarifying that 
using marijuana or engaging in cannabis-related activities—including working at a state-licensed 
dispensary or cultivation operation—makes immigrants ineligible for citizenship because it means 
that they do not have ‘good moral character.’”  Id.).  
 165. See Federal Collateral Consequences, supra note 11. 
 166. For example, over two hundred thousand students have lost federal financial aid 
eligibility, because of a drug conviction.  See Drug War Statistics, supra note 12; see also, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Denial of Federal Benefits Program, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails. as 
px?Program_ID=57 (last visited July 22, 2019) (noting that state and federal courts—as part of the 
sentencing process—have the ability to deny all or selected federal benefits to individuals who are 
convicted of drug trafficking or drug possession, and supplying a list of the many federal benefits 
that may be denied to convicted individuals).  
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citizenry, who are often prohibited from enjoying constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and other societal benefits.167 
For example, the retroactivity provision in the California legalization 
laws do not address the collateral consequences that result from rightful or 
wrongful marijuana arrests.  Hence, the stigmatizing effects of marijuana 
arrests are not rectified by Proposition 64.  Ultimately, most current 
retroactivity rules do not provide for making a past offender whole, such as 
compensating the offender for time spent in jail or for damage done to the 
offender’s reputation.168 
In comparison, Illinois recently enacted the most aggressive laws to 
address the issue of retroactive amelioration of past pot offenders.169  While 
Illinois does not require the physical destruction of circuit court files,170 it 
pardons individuals with nonviolent convictions for amounts of cannabis up 
to thirty grams.171  Yet, even still, the Illinois law fails to redress the negative 
collateral consequences past pot laws have on people’s livelihoods, many of 
which are controlled by federal regulations. 
Observation #2: The legalization laws fail to remediate past offenders 
of the negative, collateral consequences of the past (and some current) 
marijuana laws. 
3. Post-Conviction Remedies 
The post-conviction remedies that might be available following 
legalization are unsatisfactory for several reasons.  First, the legalization 
laws fail to free people from incarceration or qualify people for parole.172  
Notwithstanding, the amelioration of past pot offenders would have a 
tremendous impact on the lives of people currently serving time in prisons 
 
 167.  See Bender, supra note 19, at 704-05 (discussing how most low-wage employers, 
including fast food restaurants, retail stores, hotels, and public transportation, require drug testing, 
and that racial minorities may bear the brunt of these requirements through such private contracts, 
and, further, that past drug offenses can haunt the applicant, as more than ninety percent of 
employers undertake background checks on prospective employees that have criminal records).   
 168.  See Margaret Colgate Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Forgoing Legislative Experiments 
in Restoring Rights and Status, 30 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 231 (2018); see also, Alana 
Rosen, High Time for Criminal Justice Reform: Marijuana Expungement Statutes in States with 
Legalized or Decriminalized Marijuana Laws (Feb. 1, 2019), SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstra 
ct=3327533. 
 169.  See Illinois’s Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/ 
10100HB1438enr.htm (last visited July 3, 2019) (providing, inter alia, for expungement of 
marijuana offenses and defining “expunge” to mean to “physically destroy the records or return 
them to the petitioner and to obliterate the petitioner’s name from any official index or public 
record, or both.”). 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id.  
 172. See generally, Part I.B. 
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and jails throughout the United States.173  Perhaps, the most significant of 
these situations is people who are serving of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole (hereinafter “LWOP”), due in whole or in part to a 
marijuana conviction.174  Parenthetically, despite the apparent “cruel and 
unusual punishment” aspect of these sentences, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
failed to rule these sentences as unconstitutional, despite having had the 
opportunity to do so.175 
Resentencing or exoneration of inmates following legalization can 
mean freedom, a return to family and community, the right to habitation, a 
return of a sense of self-worth, and the enjoyment of governmental benefits 
for many convicted of marijuana-related crimes.176  For examples, California 
Proposition 64 expressly provides for the resentencing of people convicted 
under California’s previous marijuana laws who would serve a lighter 
sentence under the new legalization regime.177  However, the new law 
requires that a convicted person apply to a court in order to have their 
sentence reduced.178  If serving time, such relief may mean a release from 
jail for time already served.179  Thus, the impact of retroactive amelioration 
can be real and life-changing. 
 
 173. See Drug War Statistics, supra note 12, (noting that twenty-two states have decriminalized 
or removed the threat of jail time for the simple possession of small amounts of marijuana); see 
also, infra, Part I, B. 
 174. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A Living Death: Life without Parole for Nonviolent 
Offenses, https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/111813-lwop-complete-report.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 
2019).  “Dale Wayne Green is serving LWOP for his role as middleman in a sale of $20 worth of 
marijuana to an undercover deputy . . . Green was convicted of distribution of marijuana and 
sentenced to mandatory life without parole as a third-strike offender under Louisiana’s multiple 
offender law.”  Id.  Mr. Green is one of many people serving excessive sentences related to 
marijuana offenses.  See also, Kristen Gwynne, Ten Worst Sentences for Marijuana-Related 
Crimes: Punishments of this Sort Seldom Fit the Offense, but these Cases are Especially Egregious, 
SALON (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.salon.com/2012/10/29/ten_worst_sentences_for_mari 
juana_related_crimes/. 
 175. The Editorial Board, Outrageous Sentences for Marijuana, The New York Times (Apr. 
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/opinion/outrageous-sentences-for-marijuana. 
html (discussing implications of Booker v. Alabama and analyzing that LWOP is not cruel and 
unusual punishment); see also, Mark Hansen, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Challenge to Life 
Sentence for Pot Possession, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/  
article/supreme_court_refuses_to_hear_challenge_to_life_sentence_for_pot_possession. 
 176. See Sernoffsky, supra note 140.  As a disproportionate number of people affected by 
marijuana offenses are Black, the San Francisco District Attorney’s decision to dismiss and seal 
more than 3,000 misdemeanor marijuana convictions in San Francisco dating back to 1975 for a 
prosecutors’ review and, if necessary, re-sentence 4,940 felony marijuana cases will greatly benefit 
the African-American community.  Rev. Amos Brown, president of the San Francisco chapter of 
the NAACP, said, “it is a step toward setting black people free to live in the community, to have 
jobs, to have health care, to have a decent education, and we just need to keep this good thing a-
rollin’.”  Id. 
 177. See Ingraham, supra note 8. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  
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For example, imagine that Marty (from Back to the Future) was 
convicted of transporting marijuana for sale in 2014.  Imagine further, that 
at that time, under California law, Marty was convicted for a felony offense 
and was sentenced to three years in jail, as he had no prior criminal record.  
However, in 2016, with the enactment of Proposition 64, Marty’s offense 
would be a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in jail.  With an 
aggressive approach to retroactive amelioration, Marty could file a petition 
for resentencing which the prosecutor should not oppose, although the 
process would be both costly and time consuming.  As a result, his sentence 
would be reduced, and he would be immediately released from jail.180 
Observation #3: An aggressive approach to retroactive amelioration 
would reduce some marijuana-related sentences and may be life-changing 
for many current inmates. 
Fourth, the legalization laws fail to provide reparations to communities 
devastated by the WOD, specifically the socially and economically 
vulnerable segments of our country.181  While the legalization of marijuana 
is expected to and has, in fact, increased revenue for the states in the form of 
sales taxes, the new laws mainly ignore the damages done to various 
communities.  However, recently, Illinois enacted a bold provision that will 
provide potentially large sums of investments in those communities 
negatively impacted by the WOD.182  Hence, most legalization laws fail to 
provide for resources, including funding, to rebuild communities devastated 
by the WOD. 
Observation #4: The legalization laws fail to redress the WOD’s harm 
to communities, particularly those inhabited by socially and economically 
vulnerable segments of society. 
And fifth, the legalization laws do not guarantee a right to amelioration, 
let along full exoneration.  Even States that expressly provide for some form 
of retroactive amelioration take a “top-down” approach to retroactivity.  That 
is, they provide relief as a matter of privilege or mercy, rather than as a matter 
of right.  In order words, past offenders would be lucky if they receive some 
 
 180. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 169.  Relative to Mr. Green, 
Louisiana’s marijuana legalization law does not apply retroactively to exonerate a habitual 
offender with a minor marijuana conviction.  This is because his conviction was not based on 
the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.  See also, Matt Ferner, This Man is Serving More 
Than 13 Years in Prison over Two Joints’ Worth of Marijuana, HUFF POST (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bernard-noble-marijuana_us_55b6b838e4b0074ba5a 
5e160. 
 181. See Bender, supra note 23. 
 182. See McDonald, supra note 92. 
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relief, rather than being entitled to relief.  If past pot offenders had a 
constitutionally based to retroactive amelioration exists, then State 
governments would be required to swiftly take action to redress past 
offenses.  To date, no State marijuana legalization laws have identified or 
embraced such a principle that would ensure an offender’s rights to 
exoneration. 
I believe that, for several reasons, such a right exists, as will be explored 
in great detail in Parts II and III of this Article.  One reason relates to the 
retroactivity rules.  Unlike normally enacted legislation, the legalization of 
marijuana laws have mainly resulted from statewide ballot measures, direct 
initiatives, propositions, questions, or referenda (“direct democracy”),183 
with very few of them resulting from enacted legislation.184  This means that 
the retroactivity rules that apply to legislation might not apply to marijuana 
legalization.  Furthermore, the federal prohibition of marijuana complicates 
the retroactivity of State marijuana laws, as federal law preempts state law.185 
Observation #5: The legalization laws fail to provide past offenders 
with a right to amelioration, forcing such offenders to rely on the 
government’s acts of mercy. 
In summary, the observations relative to retroactivity and amelioration 
lead to a profound conclusion: current marijuana legalization laws greatly 
fail to ameliorate or exonerate past pot offenders, because retroactivity is not 
guaranteed, and, even when retroactivity is expressly provided for, 
amelioration is both superficial and restricted.  Consequently, Part I shows 
that the legalization of marijuana creates a problem relative to retroactive 
amelioration, one that demands a strong, individual rights’ solution—a 
 
 183. See infra Part III. See, e.g., California Proposition 215, http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/1996/ 
general/pamphlet/215text.htm (last visited July 22, 2019) (“the Compassionate Use Act,” enacted 
in 1996, established a medical cannabis program), and California Proposition 64, available at 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB64 (last visited 
July 22, 2019) (the “Adult Use of Marijuana Act,” enacted in 2016, legalized the sale and 
distribution of cannabis in both a dry and concentrated form, for recreational use).  Relative to 
direct democracy as a means of enacting changes in the law, some question it, while others defend 
it.  See generally, THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST 
GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999); and Carson Bruno, Is It 
Time To Reconsider California’s Initiative System?, STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOOVER INSTITUTE 
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/it-time-reconsider-californias-initiative-system. 
 184. See H.B. 1438, Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act (2019), http://www.ilga.gov/ 
legislation/publicacts/101/PDF/101-0027.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
 185. See CSA, supra note 4 (explaining that the federal government prohibits marijuana, as a 
Schedule 1 substance).  See also, infra Part III; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (ruling, 6-3, 
that the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution allowed the federal 
government to criminalize the production and use of homegrown cannabis, even if a state approved 
its use for medicinal purposes).  
A - CRUSTO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:34 AM 
396 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:3 
constitutional rationale for amelioration and a radical plan for remedies for 
past pot offenders.186  In Part II, this Article presents a seminal solution and 
a model code to address the retroactivity amelioration quandary. 
II. Solution 
The proposed solution to the retroactive amelioration quandary is the 
normative claim that past pot offenders have a constitutional right to the 
retroactive application of new, State-adopted legalization laws.187  Further, 
as the right to retroactivity would apply to a large number of past offenders 
over an extended period of time, I propose a broad approach to amelioration, 
that is, that amnesty188 should be adopted.189  This recommendation is 
detailed in the Marijuana Amnesty Code, following the main text of this 
Article.  I have drafted the Code with the hopes that government officials 
and policymakers will adopt it as a model for reform in this area of law.  The 
constitutional basis for a right to retroactive amelioration for past pot 
offenders is presented next. 
III. Support for Retroactive Amelioration 
Part III supports the normative claim that past pot offenders are entitled 
to retroactive amelioration in states that have legalized marijuana.  This 
claim is based on a two-step analysis. First, there is Supreme Court support 
 
 186. This rights-based approach to the retroactive amelioration of the legalization of marijuana 
laws is consistent with former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s vision of 
federalism, as a means to protect individuals from undue governmental intrusion.  See, e.g., 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 at 42 (dissenting in a medical marijuana decision, stating “This case 
exemplifies the role of States as laboratories.  The States’ core police powers have always included 
authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”); 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that drug checkpoints violated the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizure).  See generally, Bradley 
W. Joondeph, The Deregulatory Valence of Justice O’Connor’s Federalism, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 507 
(2008).   
 187. See infra Part III, under the principle of lex mitior, past pot offenders have the right to be 
judged by the new, milder standards of culpability.  
 188. The goal of the proposed code is to make the past offender whole, embracing the spirit of 
amnesty, by aggressively and immediately removing any and all negative impacts from the prior, 
now-antiquated law.  This proposal reflects recommendations from others, including: MARIJUANA 
POLICY PROJECT, Model State Civil Fine Bill, https://www.mpp.org/issues/ legalization/model-
state-legalization-bill/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2019); NORML, Real World Ramifications of 
Cannabis Legalization and Legalization, http://norml.org/pdf_files/NORML_Real_World_ 
Ramifications_Legalization.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2019) (proposing a regulatory scheme for 
marijuana similar to that for alcohol); S. 1689, 115th Congress (2017); NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR 
MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, Marijuana: Comparison of State Laws Legalizing Personal, Non-
Medical Use (2016), http://www.namsdl.org/library/33FD7B09-D862-91A9-48FFEFD87F 5D46 
11/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2019); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 169, at 14-15.   
 189. The provisions of the Marijuana Amnesty Code (hereinafter “MAC”) are provided as an 
Addendum to this Article. 
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for the rule that a “substantive” change in the Constitution applies 
retroactively.190  Second, State marijuana legalization laws are “substantive” 
to this issue because they reflect constitutional principles and because they 
largely derive from direct democracy, which are or resemble constitutional 
amendments. 
A. Right to Retroactivity 
Retroactivity rules fall into two categories: those that do not guarantee 
the right to retroactivity (hereinafter “privilege”), and those that do 
(hereinafter “right”).  As previously discussed, the rules relative to 
retroactivity of substantive criminal laws generally focus in on an overly 
narrow manner on legislative and executive laws.191  This view of 
retroactivity (privilege) disfavors the automatic application of retroactivity, 
relying instead on the “will” of the legislature or the “mercy” of the 
executive.192  Generally, privilege rules disfavor retroactivity in so far as they 
do not imply retroactivity; rather, they require that the law expressly provide 
for retroactivity.193  Pursuant to privilege rules, a past pot offender must rely 
on the goodwill or mercy of the government for relief.194  Further, when 
privilege rules expressly provide for retroactivity, the scope of the 
amelioration, relative to marijuana legalization, is uncertain, costly, and 
superficial.195 
Over the last several years, legal scholars have sought various rationales 
to overcome the privilege rules of retroactivity, especially when a sentence 
is final.196  For example, Professor S. David Mitchell claims that retroactive 
amelioration should be based on fairness and mercy,197 arguing that Congress 
 
 190. See infra Part III, B.  
 191. See supra Part I, B, for a discussion of legislative and executive laws.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See supra Part I, C, for a discussion of legislative and executive laws relative to 
retroactivity.  
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra note 32.  See generally, Douglas Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and 
Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 151 (2014) (challenging the strength of those 
finality interests in cases where a collateral attack seeks only to alter a criminal sentence without 
affecting the underlying conviction); see also, Reisinger, supra note 33. Cf. Ryan W. Scott, In 
Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 
179, 180 (2014) (defending the government’s interest in finality as a basis for many barriers to 
collateral relief and noting that the nonretroactivity of “new constitutional rules” of criminal 
procedure, in particular, is grounded principally in respect for the finality of criminal judgments).  
Courts are also concerned with the threat to ‘‘comity’’ between the federal government and the 
states that arises when federal courts overturn state court convictions on federal habeas.  See, e.g., 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (‘‘[W]e have recognized that interests of comity . . . must also 
be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review.’’).  
 197. See Mitchell, supra note 32. 
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has no rational reason to distinguish between those whose sentences were 
finalized on the day that the congressional amelioration decision went into 
effect, from those whose sentences were not finalized.198  Accordingly, 
Professor Mitchell asserts that neither consequentialist nor retributivist 
theories of punishment support continuing punishment for those whose 
actions are subsequently legalized or punished less severely.199  Further, 
Professor Harold J. Krent claims that, relative to changes in crack-cocaine 
sentencing, the traditional justifications against the automatic application of 
amelioration do not apply when Congress is the actor,200 especially for 
“instrumental” reasons.201 
In summary, both the privilege rules and the finality doctrine restrict 
the retroactive application of legislative criminal laws, showing deference to 
the will of the legislature.  However, this approach fails to view retroactivity 
from the perspective of the constitutional rights of past offenders, who are 
arguably victims of an overly aggressive criminal justice system.  What is 
needed is a theory of retroactivity, which will effectively exonerate the 
millions of past pot offenders in states that have legalized pot.  This 
circumstance is particularly unique and compelling because not only has 
marijuana use become legal with widespread public support, but licensed 
sellers are able to actively capitalize off of these marijuana reforms while 
others remain in prison for the same act. 
Contrary to the privilege rules, there is another body of retroactivity 
rules, by which a person is entitled to retroactivity as a matter of right.  
Where it is applicable, retroactivity is guaranteed and applies “bottom-up,” 
in such a manner that a person does not have to rely on the goodwill or mercy 
of the government.  These rights-based rules of retroactivity derive from two 
different sources.  The first comes from the courts, including judicial 
pronouncements relating to the Constitution (hereinafter “judicial laws”).202  
The second set of rules results from amendments to the Constitution or state 
 
 198. Mitchell, supra note 32.  For a similar view expressed by a jurisprudential legend, see 
Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 
HASTINGS L.J. 533, 553 n.54 (1977). 
 199. See Mitchell, supra note 32.   
 200. See Krent, supra note 32 (arguing that “three related fundamental concerns-honoring 
reliance interests, imposing rule of law constraints on legislatures, and valuing certainty-largely are 
absent when Congress ameliorates the severity of prior penalties or decriminalizes conduct 
altogether.”).  See also, Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil 
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2144 (1996).  
 201.  “[L]egislatures may reduce the penalties for particular crimes, not because of changed 
circumstances or views of the wrongfulness of the underlying conduct, but for instrumental reasons 
due to the rising cost of incarceration or the social costs of incarcerating too many young men.”  
Krent, supra note 32, at 64.   
 202. The term “judicial laws,” for purposes of this Article, means laws that change the standard 
of substantive criminal culpability that result from a court decision, often based upon an 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 
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acts of direct democracy (hereinafter “constitutional amendments”).203  The 
following section discusses how judicial laws and, in particular, Supreme 
Court decisions have established constitutional criteria for when retroactivity 
applies as a matter of right. 
Courts play a role in determining the retroactivity of criminal laws.204  
In addition to having the jurisdiction to review legislative laws, courts, 
especially the United States Supreme Court, have the power to decide on the 
constitutionality of criminal laws.  However, the Court’s rules may vary on 
whether its decision creates (or finds) new law, or whether it is an 
interpretation of the scope of an Act of Congress, a Presidential Executive 
Order, or an administrative action.205  The Supreme Court has articulated a 
more general presumption against reading statutes and administrative rules 
retroactively.206  Generally, the Court has stated the principle that 
retroactivity is disfavored in the law.207 
However, outside of interpreting statutes, the Supreme Court has 
assessed whether the Constitution explicitly or implicitly guarantees certain 
fundamental or constitutional rights, such as the right of privacy.208  On these 
occasions, the Court must determine whether the protection of a certain right 
is to be applied retroactively.209  The most recent example is Obergefell v. 
Hodges,210 where the Court held that the right to marry is constitutionally 
guaranteed, so as to apply to same-sex couples.211  Even when the Court’s 
decisions are clearly substantive, lower courts must determine whether that 
 
 203. The term “constitutional amendments,” for purposes of this Article, means laws that 
change the standard of substantive criminal culpability that results from an amendment to the U.S. 
or state constitution.  
 204. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 22 (discussing a Colorado case about marijuana 
retroactivity). 
 205. See infra Part III. 
 206. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (finding no clear 
congressional intent to apply a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to pending cases); Bowen 
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988) (noting that an administrative agency 
can’t promulgate rules that apply retroactively, unless expressly granted that power by Congress). 
 207. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532 (1998) (citing Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208). 
 208. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015). 
 209. See, e.g., id.; see generally, Paul Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling 
Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U PA. L. REV. 650 (June 2009). 
 210. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.  
 211. Id.  
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right applies retroactively.212  Nevertheless, retroactivity is not always 
immediate.213 
The right to retroactivity is particularly challenging when it comes to 
the Court’s decisions relating to the area of criminal law.214  Much of the 
recent scholarship in this area focuses on the retroactivity of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions relating to the death penalty.215  As to the retroactive 
application of its decisions, a brief history explains the Court’s transition to 
its current position on the matter.216  Until 1965, the Court treated all 
constitutional rights as fully retroactive to all persons entitled to such rights, 
regardless of whether their prosecutions were final or nonfinal.217  As it 
expanded the constitutional rights of criminal procedure and habeas corpus, 
the Court adopted a nuanced approach to retroactivity.218 
In 1965, in Linkletter v. Walker,219 the Court deviated from the strong 
presumption that favored retroactivity, by stating that “the Constitution 
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect.”220  Next, the Court 
 
 212. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395 (Apr. 2017) 
(evaluating the constitutional basis for “backdating” same-sex marriages following the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, to provide marital benefits such as social 
security); Lee-Ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of 
Obergefell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873 (2016) (examining the retroactivity of Obergefell as it applies 
to trusts and estates and property issues and the jurisprudence of retroactivity); Julie B. Colton, 
Determining a Wedding Date: Retroactive Recognition of Same Sex Common Law Marriages Post-
Obergefell, JURIST, Sept. 19, 2017, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2017/09/julie-colton-
obergefell-common-law/ (analyzing how the Obergefell decision applies to prior, common law 
marriages); Steven A. Young, Retroactive Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage for the Purpose of 
the Confidential Marital Communications Privilege, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319 (2016) (arguing 
for a modification of the confidential marital communication privilege unfairly prejudiced by now 
unconstitutional laws).  Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that state criminal 
laws prohibiting interracial marriage were unconstitutional). 
 213. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that state laws which 
established racial segregation in public schools were unconstitutional and that desegregation would 
take place “with all deliberate speed”).  See generally, RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE 
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 
(1976).   
 214. See supra notes 28-34.  
 215. See Westen supra note 31; Bird; Doherty, supra note 36.  
 216. See Westen, supra note 31, at 203-6.  
 217. See Westen, supra note 31, at 202 (citing Danforth v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 264, 271 
(2008).  See also, Note, Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1645 (2005); Harper v. 
Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (citing Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973), 
stating that “[b]oth the common law and our own decisions have recognized a general rule of 
retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court.”) (internal citations omitted)).  See 
generally, Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial 
Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 815-16 (2003).   
 218. See Westen, supra note 31, at 202. 
 219. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). 
 220. Id. (deciding whether Mapp v. Ohio should be given retroactive effect).  See also, Collins 
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (holding that the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is 
violated in the following situations: if a law is applied retroactively that punishes an act previously 
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presented a balancing test that would weigh the merits and demerits of each 
case, to ultimately decide whether a law should be given retroactive effect.221  
According to the Linkletter decision, to determine retroactivity, a court 
would conduct a three-part test: first, to consider “the prior history of the rule 
in question;” second, to look at “the purpose and effect of the law;” and, 
third, to determine “whether the retroactive operation will further or retard 
its operation.”222  As applied to the exclusionary rule facing the Court in 
Linkletter, the Court held that the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp did 
not apply to state court convictions which had become final before its 
rendition.223  Hence, the Linkletter Court stated that even when the error 
complained of might be fundamental, it must also be of “the nature requiring 
us to overturn all final convictions based upon it.”224  Despite its critics, the 
Linkletter rule on retroactivity was followed for over twenty years.225 
However, in 1989, in Teague v. Lane,226 the Supreme Court made a 
radical shift in direction relative to retroactivity and finality, by rejecting the 
Linkletter’s distinctions of rights.227  In Teague, the Court treated all its 
interpretations of constitutional, statutory, and common law rights as 
retroactive.228  The Court reasoned that its findings of rights are not novel, 
but merely reflect rights, that have been in existence prior to the Court’s 
ruling.229 
Consequently, the Teague Court divided its rules of retroactivity rights 
into two categories that differ from those established in Linkletter.230  First, 
where a decision is so clearly dictated by prior precedent that rulings to the 
contrary would be unreasonable,231 the decision is fully retroactive to all 
 
committed, which was innocent when done; if a law makes more burdensome the punishment for 
crime after its commission; or if a law deprives an individual of any defense available under the 
law in effect when the crime was committed).   
 221. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 629. 
 222. Id. (stating that, in determining whether a decision applies retroactively, the Court had to 
“weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, 
its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation”).  
Further, the Linkletter test applied to both direct and collateral attacks, regardless of finality.  Id.   
 223. Id. at 639-640. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See generally, James B. Haddad, Retroactivity Should be Rethought: A Call for the End 
of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417 (1969). 
 226. Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 301-05 (1989); Cf. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435 (1987) 
(striking down retroactive application of Florida’s revised sentencing scheme); Weaver v. Graham, 
450 U.S. 24, 36 (1981) (denying retroactive application of revised sentencing schemes in Florida). 
 227. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288 at 301-05. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.; see also, Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).  This approach follows 
the jurisprudential belief that the Court does not create or legislate on the law, but that the Court 
merely rules on the law already in existence. 
 230. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301-07. 
 231. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301-07; see also, Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993). 
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defendants, regardless of whether their convictions are final.232  However, 
where a decision is “new,” the Court will apply two subcategories of rules, 
“substantive” versus “procedural.”233  When the Court finds a right to be 
substantive, it is available retroactively to all past defendants, regardless of 
finality.234  On the other hand, when the Court finds a right to be procedural, 
it is retroactive to past defendants on direct review, but is not available to 
collateral attacks on a final conviction by federal habeas corpus.235 
The Court added a caveat to the application of the procedural rule, that 
is, when the Court’s rule represents a “‘watershed’ rule of procedure,” that 
“implicate[s] fundamental fairness” and “accuracy” of the trial as to be 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”236  In that case, such a ruling 
would apply retroactively, regardless of finality.  Therefore, the Teague 
Court made clear that the Supreme Court has the power to apply its decisions 
retroactively, especially when a decision reinforces past precedent, is 
substantive, or is a watershed rule of procedure.237 
To understand the constitutional nature of retroactivity, a closer 
analysis of the Teague decision is required.238  First, the Court in Teague 
took the opportunity to revamp the Linkletter rules on retroactivity.239  
Second, the Teague Court negated the Linkletter approach which viewed 
retroactivity as a balancing test.240  Instead, writing for the plurality, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor moved the role of retroactivity from the conclusory 
end of a balancing act to a position of prominence: 
Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new 
rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, even-handed 
justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly 
situated.241 
Third, with adequate analysis of the quotation, it is evident the Court 
announced a rule of law, namely, that retroactivity would automatically 
 
 232. Id.; see also, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).   
 233. Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40; see also, Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, n.4 
(2004). 
 234. See also, Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, n.4 (2004). 
 235. Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See generally, Peter Westen, Lex Mitior: Converse of Ex Post Facto and Window into 
Criminal Desert, 18 NEW CRIMINAL LAW REV. 167-213 (Mar. 20, 2015), U of Michigan Public 
Law Research Paper No. 455, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2588143 (last visited July 15, 2019) 
(citing Teague, 489 U.S. 310, 312-13). 
 239. Teague, 489 U.S. 288 at 300 (noting that “the question of retroactivity with regard to 
petitioner’s fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief,” the Court decided sue 
sponte to revamp the Linkletter rules of retroactivity). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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apply.242  Fourth and foremost, the Court’s rationale demonstrates that 
“even-handed justice”243 is a fundamental principle of due process or 
fairness, which mandates that a past offender is entitled to be judged by the 
lesser of the standards of criminal culpability, the one from the past or the 
one in the present.244  Therefore, the Teague Court heightened retroactivity 
to the status of a substantive due process right, albeit, not expressly.245  That 
conclusion means that the Teague decision stands for the principle that 
automatic retroactive application follows “substantive” changes in the law 
as a constitutional right. 
This new approach to the retroactivity of substantive changes in the 
criminal laws has recently come front and center in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence relating to the sentencing of juveniles.  In 2016, in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana,246 the Court elaborated on its retroactivity rules 
as they applied to decisions concerning criminal laws.247  The Court held that 
prisoners previously given automatic LWOP for crimes committed as 
juveniles, must have their cases reviewed for re-sentencing or be considered 
 
 242. Teague, 489 U.S. 288 at 300. 
 243. Justice O’Conner’s opinion does not define or explain the term “even handed justice.”  
See William W. Berry III, Normative Retroactivity, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 489 (2016), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1617&context=jcl (providing the 
following rationale and research behind the nature of even handed justice).  One might suppose that 
by even handed justice, Judge O’Conner might have been referring to the commonsense or morale 
reaction to the travesty that past offenders can remain in prison or even be executed in cases where, 
if decided today, the imposition of that sentence would violate their constitutional rights.  See 
generally, Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (addressing the potential unfairness of 
non-retroactivity approaches to new constitutional rules by reframing the inquiry in terms of 
constitutional remedies doctrine); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current 
Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (1991) (exploring the 
unfairness of Teague in the death penalty context).  This seems offensive both as a matter of 
individual rights and as a matter of equal treatment under the law.  See generally, e.g., Stephen R. 
Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1977) (exploring theories of retroactivity, 
including fairness and equality, before arguing that the concept of legal validity should determine 
the content of “retroactive law”).  
 244. See infra Part III for a discussion of the embodiment of “even-handed justice,” which is 
hereinafter referred to as lex mitior.  
 245. See infra Part III for a discussion of substantive due process ruling of the Court.  
 246. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 727-28 (2016) (holding that its previous ruling 
in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), that a mandatory life sentence without parole should 
not apply to persons convicted of murder committed as juveniles, should be applied retroactively).  
Montgomery and Miller are a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that, since 2005, have 
mitigated the harshness of sentencing of juveniles and persons who committed crimes as juveniles, 
based, in part, on scientific evidence showing that juvenile brains are not developmentally 
equivalent to those of adults.  See also, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (holding 
that the death penalty for children under eighteen years old was unconstitutional); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that it was unconstitutional to impose mandatory life 
sentence without parole on prisoners who committed non-murder crimes as juveniles). 
 247. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727-28. 
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for parole.248  At first glance, both the holding and subject matter of the 
Montgomery case appear far removed from the issue of the retroactivity of 
state laws that legalize marijuana.  However, arguably, the Court’s dicta in 
Montgomery provides support for the retroactivity of pot laws. 
First, the Court in Montgomery found that it had jurisdiction over 
Louisiana’s prisoners because the rule governing retroactivity is 
constitutional, not statutory.249  Second, Justice Kennedy, in writing for the 
majority, stated that retroactivity applied because it was founded on 
substantive grounds, in the application of precedent watershed principles of 
retroactivity.250 
As a result of the Supreme Court decisions in Teague and Montgomery, 
one might conclude that a “new” criminal law that lessens or eliminates 
criminal culpability or mitigates sentencing applies retroactively and 
automatically to past offenders if that law is either substantive or is a 
watershed rule of procedure.  Unfortunately, the right of retroactivity does 
not guarantee amelioration.251  Relative to the legalization of pot, the 
watershed rule of procedure does not apply, but as will be argued next, the 
new marijuana laws are substantive and, therefore, apply retroactively as a 
matter of constitutional law.  What makes the Montgomery decision 
especially persuasive is that it views the retroactivity of criminal laws that 
lessen culpability (albeit sentencing) to be a matter of constitutional law, in 
that it applies regardless of finality (most marijuana offenses are final), and 
it applies to State collateral matters.  From this decision, the Court’s 
approach to retroactivity is consistent with that of a majority of other 
countries.252 
 
 248. Id.; see also, Leading Case: 1. Constitutional Law: Eighth Amendment—Retroactivity of 
New Constitutional Rules—Juvenile Sentencing—Montgomery v. Louisiana, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
377 (2016). 
 249. See supra note 19, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727-728.  
 250. Id. (Justice Kennedy, stating, the decision was based “on the diminished culpability of all 
juvenile offenders, who are, he said, immature, susceptible to peer pressure and capable of change.  
Very few, he said, are incorrigible.  But he added that as a general matter the punishment was out 
of bounds.”).  As to the definition of “substantive,” see Leading Case: 1. Constitutional Law: 
Eighth Amendment—Retroactivity of New Constitutional Rules—Juvenile Sentencing—
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 130 HARV. L. REV. 377 (2016).   
 251. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-37 (writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy, stating 
that “prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect 
irreparable corruption; and if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must 
be restored”); see also, State v. Montgomery, 194 So. 3d 606, 609 (La. 2016) (vacating 
Montgomery’s life sentence and remanding for resentencing); Grace Toohey, Board Denies Parole 
to Man Who Served More than 50 years after Killing Deputy when He Was Juvenile, ADVOCATE 
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_acca953e-1579-
11e8-aa66-1b036f45b902.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2019) (reporting that in February 2018 and 
April 2019, Montgomery had parole hearings, and was denied parole both times). 
 252. See supra note 104. 
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Proposition #1: This discussion of the rules of judicial laws on 
retroactivity leads to the proposition that current retroactivity rules ensure 
retroactivity to past pot offenders, if the legalization laws are new and 
represent a substantive right. And that the concept of “even-handed justice” 
means past pot offenders have a constitutional right to retroactive 
amelioration. 
B. Marijuana Legalization Laws Are Substantive.253 
1. Lex Mitior Is a Constitutional Principle. 
There are two arguments to support the proposition that past pot 
offenders are entitled to retroactive application of state legalization as a 
matter of substantive right.  The first argument is that the principle of lex 
mitior254 is a substantive rule of law, well-grounded in constitutional and 
 
 253. It is also likely that on the same basis, past pot offender are entitled to retroactive 
amelioration, because lex mitior is a fundamental, “past” constitutional principle, which, according 
to Teague, would result in automatic retroactivity.  In addition to the substantive-right analysis 
above, there are other constitutional arguments in support of retroactive relief for past pot offenders.  
First, marijuana criminalization arguably violates the Fifth Amendment.  See Leary v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 6, 37 (1969) (holding that the MTA was unconstitutional, since it violated the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, privilege against self-incrimination); National 
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding (1972), 
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/nc/ncmenu.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2019) 
(reporting that the federal prohibition of marijuana was constitutionally suspect and stated that 
regardless of whether the courts would overturn the prohibition of pot possession, the executive 
and legislative branches have a duty to obey the Constitution).  See also, Alex Pasquariello, Federal 
Lawsuit Against Sessions and DEA says Marijuana’s Schedule I Status Unconstitutional, THE 
CANNABIST (July 25, 2017), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/07/25/marijuana-schedule-i-
lawsuit-unconstitutional/84473/ (last visited July 22, 2019) (citing to Washington, et al., v. 
Sessions, et al., filed as Case 1:17-cv-005625 (filed July 24, 2017) in the Southern District Court 
of New York, wherein the Plaintiffs claim the classification of cannabis as a Schedule I substance 
is so “irrational” that it violates the U.S. Constitution).  Further, in its inception, the prohibition of 
marijuana as a Schedule A drug arguably violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Such a criminal 
designation was especially punitive against people who were addicted to certain drugs and were 
unable to change their drug “habit” to comply with the new criminal standards.  It was inherently 
unfair to punish people for such past behavior, which was previously legal, overnight turning the 
users of these drugs from law-abiding citizens to criminals.  That leads to the next point, which is 
how the law facilitate retroactivity of marijuana laws, when such application applies to a large 
group of people over a long period of time.  See generally, Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the 
Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81 KENTUCKY L.J. 323 (1992-93), https://scholarship.law. 
georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2437&context=facpub (last visited Aug. 18, 2019) 
(arguing . . . the values that underlie the Ex Post Facto Clause demand that there be some protection 
against civil laws that are punitive in nature). 
 254. The term, “lex mitior,” which literally means “the milder law,” for purposes of this Article, 
means the constitutional and fundamental right to be judged by the lesser standard of criminal 
culpability that is more advantageous to a past offender, when a new law is enacted or upon the 
declaration of a constitutional right or amendment of the federal or state constitution.  Here, the 
concept is broadly applied retroactively, including all post, final judgements, and not only to 
defendants, when the law changes after the crime is committed, but before a final judgment is 
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fundamental principles of due process.  Under the principle of lex mitior, a 
past pot offender has a constitutional right to retroactivity amelioration.  The 
second argument is that such legalization laws are substantive, as they result 
from direct democracy, which are, or operate as, amendments to state 
constitutions. 
a. Liberty as an Inalienable Right 
As to the first argument, there is ample support for the proposition that 
lex mitior is a substantive rule of law, supported by constitutional principles, 
including the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution (hereinafter 
“Clause”).255  The Clause expressly prohibits state and federal legislation that 
retroactively applies criminal laws that would punish past behavior.256  Yet, 
there is evidence for the proposition that the Clause and the underlying 
concept of lex mitior represent one of the many ways by which the Founding 
Fathers sought to protect the inalienable right to liberty.  A brief history of 
the Clause of the Constitution257 shows that the Founding Fathers believed 
that liberty was an inalienable right, which should be protected from 
wrongful governmental infringement or tyranny, when criminal standards 
 
handed down.  See Peter Westen, Lex Mitior: Converse of Ex Post Facto and Window into Criminal 
Desert, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 167-213 (Mar. 20, 2015), Univ. of Mich. Public Law Research 
Paper No. 455, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2588143 (last visited July 15, 2019) (assessing 
whether a state’s repeal of the death penalty would preclude all pending (not final) prosecutions for 
capital murder and questioning “whether punishing offenders under harsher laws that obtained at 
the time of their conduct can serve consequentialist and/or retributive purposes of punishment”).  
See also, Alessandro Rosanò, et al., Principle of Lex Mitior, Is that You?, NEW J. OF EUR. CRIM. 
LAW (May 22, 2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2032284417699272 (last 
visited July 22, 2019) (noting that “[t]he principle of applying the more lenient sanction—also 
called principle of lex mitior—constitutes a general principle of national criminal laws as well as a 
general principle of Union law, as confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union over 
time”). 
 255. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).  These provisions, though actually 
comprised of two separate clauses, will be referred to in this Article to as the “Ex Post Facto Clause” 
or “Clause.”  To argue that lex mitior is embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause does not suggest that 
there is a prohibition against legislation or other changes in the law, which lessens criminal 
culpability or reducing penalties.  There is no such constitutional limitation.  
 256. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 257. See generally, THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Little, Brown, and Co., 1880; reprint 3d ed. 1900). 
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change.258  This interpretation is consistent with scholarly writing on the 
history and meaning of the Clause.259 
Liberty is a fundamental right that was prominent in the most sacred 
statement of rights in United States history and uncontrovertibly, in the 
cornerstone of our culture and values—the Declaration of Independence.260  
When drafting the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the 
Founders were undoubtedly aware that the English common law recognized 
and embraced the fundamental right to liberty, as noted in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, that liberty meant “the power of locomotion, of changing 
situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own 
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due 
course of law.”261 
The Founders were also aware that the English common law embraced 
principles of due process, against wrongful infringement on the right to 
liberty, including that of lex mitior.  This ensured a person’s right to be 
judged by the lesser standard of criminal culpability.  The historic rationale 
for the inclusion of the Clause was based on the practices of the English 
Parliament, which had passed legislation as “bills of attainder” or “bills of 
pains and penalties,” which enhanced penalties for crimes after they were 
 
 258. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, LETTER FROM PHOCION, in PAPERS 485, 542-543 (Jan. 
1784), reprinted in CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 132 
(1964) (stating: “[M]en . . . change their principles with their situations-to be zealous advocates for 
the rights of the citizens when they are invaded by others, and as soon as they have it in their power, 
to become the invaders themselves-to resist the encroachments of power . . .”).  Id.  See also, James 
Iredell noted that James Iredell, Observations on George Mason’s Objections to the Federal 
Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 368, 369 (Paul L. 
Ford ed. 1888) (noting an Ex Post Facto Clause prevented the exercise of “tyranny that . . . would 
be intolerable . . . .”). 
 259. See generally, Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REV. 315 
(1920-21), William W. Crosskey, The Ex Post Facto and the Contracts Clauses in the Federal 
Convention: A Note on the Editorial Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 252-54 
(1968) (discussing the internal and external inconsistencies of Madison’s notes with respect to the 
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Breck P. McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court 
of the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 269 (1927). 
 260. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”), http://www 
.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html.  See generally, THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING 
THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION: PART ONE: SEPTEMBER 17, 1787– JANUARY 12, 1788 
(Bernard Bailyn, ed. 1993).   
 261. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes 
selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, 
Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In 
Two Volumes. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893). https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2142. 
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committed or defined acts as crimes after the fact.262  The rationale for the 
prohibition against such infringements was broad-based and included the 
concept of lex mitior—as explained in Blackstone’s Commentaries, and as 
cited in a leading Supreme Court decision on the scope of the Clause:263 
There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called 
making of laws, ex post facto, when after an action, indifferent in itself, is 
committed, the Legislator, then, for the first time, declares it to have been a 
crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it.  Here 
it is impossible, that the party could foresee such an action, innocent when it 
was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he 
had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not 
abstaining, must, of consequence, be cruel and unjust.264 
Furthermore, when drafting the Constitution, the Founders borrowed 
from various previously established state constitutions that expressly 
prohibited ex post facto laws.265  For example, in 1813, Founder and later 
President, Thomas Jefferson reported: 
The sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right is so 
strong in the United States, that few, if any, of the State constitutions have 
failed to proscribe them.  The federal constitution indeed interdicts them in 
criminal cases only; but they are equally unjust in civil as in criminal cases, 
and the omission of a caution which would have been right, does not justify 
the doing what is wrong.  Nor ought it to be presumed that the legislature 
meant to use a phrase in an unjustifiable sense, if by rules of construction it 
can be ever strained to what is just.266 
The Founders considered the prohibition of ex post facto laws so 
important, that the existence of the Clause in the Constitution was advanced 
as one argument in favor of the States’ ratification of the 1787 Constitution, 
even without a Bill of Rights attached.267 
 
 262. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798) (Justice Chase noting that these laws were used 
repeatedly under the claim that they were necessary to the kingdom’s safety, but the advocates of 
the laws were motivated by ambition and malice, and the possibility of legislative abuse is ripe); 
see Bryan R. Diederich, Risking Retroactive Punishment: Modifications of the Supervised Release 
Statute and the Ex Post Facto Prohibition, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1564 (1999).  
 263. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes 
selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, 
Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In 
Two Volumes (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2142.  
 264. See Calder, 3 U.S. 386, 396-99 (1798), quoting 1 Bl. Com. 46. 
 265. Many states constitutions have such a provision today.  See, e.g., V.A. CONST. art. I, § 11 
(“That no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . .”). 
 266. Founders Online, Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322.  
 267. See Diederich, supra note 253 (arguing that the dual supports for ex post facto prohibition 
of protecting citizens from tyranny and providing for individual justice should act as guideposts to 
help courts determine whether a law is ex post facto or not). 
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In prohibiting ex post facto laws, the Framers guaranteed that citizens 
would not be criminally punished for behavior that was legal during the 
commission of the acts, of which is presently illegal.  Essentially, it would 
be an inherently unfair policy, because a person is entitled to know what 
behavior or activities are legal in real time.  To allow the law to change that 
standard after the fact would deny a person due process, and wrongfully 
provide the government with the power to punish a person retroactively.  
More broadly, the fundamental principle reflected in the Clause’s prohibition 
was the Framers’ belief and dedication to the fundamental right to due 
process against citizens being judged by two conflicting sets of criminal 
standards, one under today’s new laws and one under yesterday’s old laws.  
Hence, the mere existence of the Clause reflects the important constitutional 
principles of fundamental fairness to individuals, equal treatment under the 
law, and protection against wrongful government infringement. 
b. Right to Due Process 
Further, lex mitior should be viewed within the broader concept of due 
process protections found in other amendments to the Constitution and their 
penumbra, particularly in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.268  For example, the Fifth Amendment269 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment270 provide two different types of due process protection: (1) 
procedural due process, which requires that before depriving a person of life, 
liberty, or property, the government must follow certain procedures; and (2) 
substantive due process, which requires that if depriving a person of life, 
liberty, or property, the government must have sufficient justification. 
Perhaps, the clearest constitutional provision protecting liberty against 
governmental infringement, without the due process, is found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  To understand the purpose of this Amendment, we 
need to examine the legal history of the United States enslavement of people 
of African descent.271  Unfortunately, prior to the Civil War, the legal system 
protected the institution of slavery and Black people were not considered 
 
 268. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458 (1895) (establishing the presumption 
of innocence of persons accused of crimes, noting “[t]he evolution of the principle of the 
presumption of innocence, and its resultant, the doctrine of reasonable doubt, make more apparent 
the correctness of these views, and indicate the necessity of enforcing the one in order that the other 
may continue to exist”). 
 269. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. . . .”). 
 270. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.  No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 271. See generally, F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARIES, AND 
QUESTIONS (Carolina Academic Press, 4th ed. 2015). 
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United States citizens.272  The Reconstruction Amendments (Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) sought to abolish slavery and protect the 
citizenship rights of newly freed Blacks.273  As the Confederate leadership 
regained power in the South, southern legislatures enacted “black codes,” 
state-sanctioned, racially based controls on the lives, liberty, and property 
rights of Black people.274  In direct response to the black codes, the country 
passed the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in pertinent part, “[N]or 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”275 
With the end of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court, in the Slaughter-
House Cases,276 effectively limited the application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment federal rights, such as the right to interstate travel, but not State 
rights, such as intra-state travel.  At the time, federal rights of citizenship 
were few, and thus the cases effectively limited protection pertinent to a 
small minority of rights.  Three years later, in United States v. Cruikshank,277 
the Supreme Court ruled that the First and Second Amendments did not 
apply to State governments, further restricting the reach of the Fourteenth 
 
 272. Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, or the Enumeration Clause or “Three-Fifths Compromise,” 
provided:  
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall 
be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound 
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons.  
The term “other Persons” referred to enslaved persons of predominately of African descent.  Id.  
Article 1, Section 9, provided,  
The Migration and Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.  
This was a reference to the importation of enslaved persons of African descent.  Id.  Article IV, 
Section 2, Clause 3, or the “Fugitive Slave Clause,” required 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged 
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom 
Service or Labour may be due.  
See also, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 396 (1857) (holding that “a negro, whose ancestors 
were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves,” whether enslaved or free, were not and could 
not be a U.S. citizen). 
 273. See supra note 262 (emphasis added).  
 274. See generally, DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008). 
 275. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 276. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81-83 (1873). 
 277. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). 
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Amendment.  However, beginning in the 1920s, a series of Supreme Court 
decisions interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to “incorporate” most 
portions of the Bill of Rights, making these portions, for the first time, 
enforceable against state governments.278  Under Selective Incorporation, the 
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses to “incorporate” individual elements of the Bill of Rights against the 
states.279  In the 1940s and 1960s, the Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions incorporating several of the specific rights from the Bill of Rights 
to apply to the States.280  Civil liberties that are protected against both federal 
and state governments’ infringements are now analyzed under the auspices 
of “fundamentality.”281 
More recently, in 2010, the Supreme Court incorporated the Second 
Amendment’s right to bear arms into the protection against state actions.282  
Overall, when a right is deemed to be fundamental, any law, policy, practice 
or action that abridges such a right is assessed by the courts under the more 
exacting standard of strict scrutiny, instead of the less demanding rational 
basis test.283  Further, when the victim of police misconduct is a racial 
minority or other protected class, such action is extremely suspect.284  As the 
Fourteenth Amendment expressly grants Congress the authority to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the Amendment, Congress is authorized to enact the laws 
that protect liberty, even retroactively.285  Hence, I contend that, relevant to 
marijuana legalization, any governmental action that wrongfully infringes on 
the fundamental right to liberty, without due process, is suspect and must be 
viewed from a strict scrutiny judicial perspective.  Therefore, when a State 
legalizes marijuana and fails to apply the new laws retroactively to past 
offenders, then that State is acting in an unconstitutional manner. 
 
 278.  See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that States were bound to 
protect freedom of speech). 
 279. See generally, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2000). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See Lutz v. City of York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir.1990) (“The test usually 
articulated for determining fundamentality under the Due Process Clause is that the putative right 
must be ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”, or ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”) (internal references omitted). 
 282. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding the right to bear arms as 
a fundamental and individual right that will necessarily be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts). 
 283. See generally, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000). 
 284. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) and 
subsequent legislation/jurisprudence (U.S. federal antidiscrimination law protects groups of people 
with a common characteristic, from discrimination on the basis of that characteristic, including 
race, color, religion, national origin, and other such categories). 
 285. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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c. Substantive Due Process 
Another argument supporting the proposition that the right to liberty is 
fundamental relative to State infringement is the Supreme Court’s expansion 
of such rights.  Since 1925, the Court has expanded its list of unenumerated 
or fundamental rights, and civil liberties that are protected against both 
federal and state infringement.286  To establish when such constitutional 
designation exists, the Court has looked to “history, legal traditions, and 
practices [to] provide the crucial ‘guide-posts for responsible 
decisionmaking (sic).’”287  Recently, the Supreme Court outlined criteria for 
whether a right is fundamental, in the landmark case of Obergefell v. 
Hodges.288  There, the Court applied “four principles and traditions [that] 
demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution 
apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”289  These same principles guide 
us in determining whether lex mitior is a fundamental right, specifically 
raising the questions: (1) is lex mitior inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy; and (2) is lex mitior a keystone of our social order?290  As 
presented next, the answer to both questions is yes. 
Thus, the Obergefell Court reiterated a substantive due process right to 
marriage inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining that its prior 
cases have held the amendment to guarantee “more than fair process,” to 
include a “substantive sphere” which bars “certain government actions 
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”291  As 
presented above, a past pot offender’s right to retroactive amelioration meets 
the recent Supreme Court’s criteria for what constitutes a fundamental right, 
as spelled out in Obergefell and other key fundamental rights decisions.  
Therefore, there is a constitutional basis for holding that lex mitior is a 
fundamental right.  This position is a logical extension of the findings on the 
 
 286. See generally, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000). 
 287. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
 288. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding the right to marry is fundamental as applied to same 
sex couples).  “The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the 
judicial duty to interpret the Constitution . . . it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in 
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect . . .  
guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions 
that set forth broad principles rather than specific requirements.”  Id. at 2599-2601. 
 289. Id. at 2599.  The Court listed four distinct reasons why the fundamental right to marry 
applies to same-sex couples: 1) “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the 
concept of individual autonomy;” 2) “the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals;” 3) it “safeguards 
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education;” and 4) “marriage is a keystone of our social order.”  Id. at 2599.   
 290. Id. at 2599, 2601. 
 291. Id. at 840 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
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nature of lex mitior, following an extensive scholarly survey of the existing 
laws on the topic. 
d. Scholarly Support for Lex Mitior 
In a groundbreaking article, distinguished Professor Peter K. Westen 
explored whether lex mitior is a constitutional norm and claimed that lex 
mitior is the “converse” or “counterpart” to the Clause.292  Professor Westen 
pondered whether lex mitior was a binding norm, a nonconstitutional norm, 
or a mere rule of leniency.293  Following a lengthy survey of the existing 
laws, he adopted a limited vision of lex mitior and concluded that the doctrine 
was a nonconstitutional norm, which could be overwritten by the 
legislature.294  He added that lex mitior is or should be the default rule, where 
legislative intent as to retroactivity is uncertain, following the rule of 
lenity.295  He also stated that lex mitior should only apply, where a judgment 
is not final.296 
Relative to the Supreme Court’s position on retroactivity, Professor 
Westen observed that Teague does not constitute legal authority on whether 
lex mitior should be legislatively or constitutionally mandated to extend to 
full retroactivity.297  Parenthetically, Professor Westen admitted that lex 
mitior could be a plausible constitutional norm under the Eighth Amendment 
or Equal Protection Clause if it were a constitutionalized subject to one or 
more of the aforementioned exceptions.298 
Contrary to Professor Westen’s limited view, I contend that lex mitior 
is a constitutional principle that cannot be modified by legislative mandate.  
First, as presented above, the Supreme Court in Teague has indirectly 
recognized the doctrine of lex mitior, when it expressly adopted the concept 
of “even-handed justice.”299  According to Justice O’Connor, “even-handed 
 
 292. See Westen, supra note 31, at 167 (stating “[t]he ex post facto doctrine prohibits 
retroactivity by prohibiting the state from prosecuting persons under criminal statutes that either 
retroactively criminalize conduct that was hitherto lawful or retroactively increase penalties for 
conduct that, while unlawful all along, was hitherto punishable less severely.  In contrast, lex mitior 
mandates retroactivity by mandating that criminal defendants receive the retroactive benefits of 
repealing statutes that either decriminalize conduct altogether or reduce punishment for it.”). 
 293. Id. at 168. 
 294. Id. at 206.  (“In the United States, however, lex mitior is a common law or a statutory 
doctrine, rather than a constitutional command, and as such, it is subject to legislative override.”); 
see also, id. at 208-13 (providing a comprehensive survey of state and federal adoption of lex 
mitior).   
 295. Id. at 207. 
 296. Id. at 196-98. 
 297. Id. at 205. 
 298. Id. at 207 (“Indeed, lex mitior could also be a plausible constitutional norm under the 
Eighth Amendment or Equal Protection Clause, if it were constitutionalized subject to one or more 
of the aforementioned exceptions.”).  
 299. See supra note 237. 
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justice” requires the retroactive application of a substantive change in 
criminal laws.300 
This brings the discussion to the second support for the right to 
retroactivity for past pot offenders; that is, that marijuana legalization laws 
are substantive because they are created by amendments to various state 
constitutions. 
2. State Constitutional Amendments 
With some exception, states have legalized pot by way of statewide 
ballot measures, direct initiative, propositions, questions, or referenda301 or 
“direct democracy.”302  This leads to a discussion of the retroactivity of 
constitutional amendments.303  Clearly, rights that are expressly provided for 
in the Constitution and state constitutions are substantive.  Equally clear, an 
amendment to constitutions that creates or elaborates on rights is also 
 
 300. See supra note 237.  
 301. See, e.g., A Colorado Marijuana Legalization Amendment, also known as “Amendment 
64,” was on the November 6, 2012 ballot in Colorado as an initiated constitutional amendment, 
where it was approved; California Proposition 215, http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/1996/gene 
ral/pamphlet/ 215text.htm (last visited July 22, 2019) (“the Compassionate Use Act,” enacted in 
1996, established a medical cannabis program), and California Proposition 64, https://leginfo. 
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB64 (last visited July 22, 2019) 
(the “Adult Use of Marijuana Act,” enacted in 2016, legalized the sale and distribution of cannabis 
in both a dry and concentrated form, for recreational use).  See also, History of Ballotpedia, 
Marijuana on the Ballot, https://ballotpedia.org/History_of_marijuana_on_the_ballot (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2019) (noting that as of 2019, seventeen of the states that legalized medical marijuana did 
so through citizen-initiated ballot measures, and the sixteen did so through legislative action; and 
that voters had approved ballot measures to legalize the recreational use of marijuana in nine states, 
with an additional state—Vermont—legalized recreational marijuana through legislative action). 
Katie Zezima, Vermont is the First State to Legalize Marijuana through Legislature, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/01/23/vermont-is-
the-first-state-to-legalize-marijuana-through-legislature/. Cf. H.B. 1438, Cannabis Regulation and 
Tax Act (2019), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/101/PDF/101-0027.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2019).   
 302. Relative to direct democracy as a means of enacting changes in the law, some question it, 
while others defend it.  See generally, THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS 
OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST 
PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999); and, 
Carson Bruno, Is It Time To Reconsider California’s Initiative System?, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
HOOVER INSTITUTE (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/it-time-reconsider-califo 
rnias-initiative-system. 
 303. See generally, The NBER/State Constitutions Database, http://www.stateconstitutions. 
umd.edu/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2019); See also, Constitutions of the Several States, 
http://www.thegreenpapers.com/slg/constitution.phtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2019); See also, DAVID 
R. BERMAN, STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS (7th ed. 2000); GEORGE ALAN TARR, ED. 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES (1996); Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional 
Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.Cf 
m?abstract_id=2461507 (last visited Sept. 2, 2019).  In this Article, we will focus the discussion 
on amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
A - CRUSTO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:34 AM 
Spring 2020] WEEDING OUT INJUSTICE 415 
substantive.304  As a result, when a State provision, such as the legalization 
of marijuana, is enacted by an act of direct democracy, that law is 
substantive, and, therefore, applies retroactively. 
Provisions for amending the Constitution, alone, show that the 
Founding Fathers expected amendments to have the same substantive effect 
as the original Constitution.  The Founding Fathers did not expect the 
Constitution to remain static, as it expressly provides for amendments to 
itself.305  Less than two years later, on December 15, 1791, the Constitution 
was amended with the Bill of Rights, Amendments One through Ten.306  
These amendments are undoubtedly substantive and guarantee specific 
personal freedoms, provide clear limitations on the Federal Judiciary power, 
and explicitly reserve the rights to the states or the people.307 
Each amendment to the Constitution applies prospectively and thereby 
becomes the law of the land on its effective date.308  Does that mean that 
every amendment was meant to apply retroactively or apply to the federal 
and state governments?  Here, the Ex Post Facto Clause309 is unique for two 
reasons.  First, it is one of the few clauses in the Constitution that expressly 
restricts both federal and state authority.310  Second, it is one of the few 
clauses in the Constitution that expressly provides for retroactivity, by 
prohibiting retroactive application of new criminal laws.311 
Relative to marijuana legalization, two particular Amendments to the 
Constitution shed some light on the retroactivity of new criminal 
amendments, which dealt with “intoxicating liquors.”312  The repeal of 
Prohibition did not mean the total, unrestricted legalization of the use and 
 
 304. See Amending State Constitutions, https://ballotpedia.org/Amending_state_constitutions 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2019).   
 305. See Article V of the United States Constitution on due process, which was ratified on June 
21, 1788 and effective on March 4, 1789.  See generally, Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA 
L. REV. 1747 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=803864 (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (seeking to 
restore the early understanding of Article V and to reject the view expressed by modern 
commentators that the Constitution should be kept largely immune from amendment).  
 306. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.   
 307. Id.  While the Bill of Rights does not expressly provide for retroactivity, one might argue 
that the Bill of Rights was expected to apply retroactively to protect individual civil liberties. 
 308. Id.  
 309. See Ex Post Facto Clause, supra note 112. 
 310. Id.  
 311. Id. 
 312. See generally, DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION (1979).  In 1920, 
reflecting society’s outcry against alcohol abuse, the U.S. Constitution was amended to prohibit the 
production, transport, and sale of alcohol.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (“After one year from the 
ratification of this article, the manufacture, sale, or transport of intoxicating liquors . . . or the 
exportation . . . for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.”).  Then, in 1933, the Twenty-First 
Amendment repealed the federal prohibition, effectively allowing the states and local communities 
to decide how to regulate alcohol.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.  
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sale of alcohol.313  On the contrary, the constitutional repeal merely ended 
the federal, nationwide prohibition of alcohol, pursuant to federal law.314  
However, in 1933, after years of the federal prohibition of intoxicating 
liquors, the country decided to change course, the Twenty-First Amendment, 
Repeal of Prohibition, was ratified, expressly repealing the Eighteen 
Amendment.315 
Neither amendment expressly provided for retroactivity; however, their 
effects implied retroactivity.316  Following the repeal, States and local 
jurisdictions still had the authority to permit, restrict, or even prohibit the use 
or sale of alcohol within their respective jurisdiction.317  Similarly, in the 
recent repeal of the federal prohibition of the use and sale of Hemp, States 
continue to have the power to prohibit, restrict, or allow such activities in 
their jurisdiction.318 
By comparison, when the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited the 
enslavement of people,319 it was meant to apply retroactively.320  In 
accordance with this Amendment, every State and individual had to comply, 
meaning that any and all enslaved persons were automatically emancipated 
by way of retroactivity.  It would have been ludicrous to hold that the 
Thirteenth Amendment only applied prospectively, that is, that people who 
were initially enslaved prior to the Amendment would still be enslaved after.  
Furthermore, in the instance where a State decriminalizes marijuana law by 
an amendment to the State constitution, there is no issue of comity as the 
state law controls state criminal law, but does not control federal law. 
Proposition #2: This discussion of the rules of constitutional 
amendments on retroactivity leads to the proposition that the current 
retroactivity laws should provide relief to past pot offenders, when they are 
enacted by way of amendments to a State’s constitution, albeit through direct 
democracy.  Arguably, such relief should logically follow when the new laws 
derive from such a significant statement of public support. 
In summary, it is inaccurate to view the rules of retroactivity of criminal 
laws strictly on legislative laws, as a “top-down” approach.  This 
misapplication of retroactivity fails to provide retroactive amelioration to 
 
 313. See generally, DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION (1979). 
 314. Id.  
 315. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.  
 316. See Mitchell, supra note 32 (noting that when the National Prohibition Act was repealed, 
the Supreme Court decided to terminate several pending prosecutions).  
 317. See KYVIG, supra note 303. 
 318. See Hudak, supra note 4. 
 319. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitudes . . . shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 320. Id.  
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past offenders.  Academic critics also seem to be captured by this “top-
down” view of retroactivity, believing that past offenders must await 
legislative or executive authorization to obtain any relief.  However, both 
United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and as well as Amendments to 
the Constitution, take a “bottom-up” approach, one that identifies and 
develops a constitutional basis for past offenders’ right to retroactive 
amelioration.321  The substantive right of retroactivity supports the 
automatic, immediate application of retroactivity to provide relief to past 
offenders, after legalization.  The next section proposes that amnesty is the 
solution to apply retroactive relief for the legalization of marijuana over an 
extended period of time. 
C.  Amnesty as the Best Remedy 
While past pot offenders are entitled to retroactive application of 
marijuana legalization laws, retroactivity does not dictate the quality or level 
of amelioration.  As a result, past pot offenders are at the mercy of the 
government to provide adequate, meaningful remedial relief to such 
offenders.  This Article suggests that a broad approach in the form of 
amnesty is the answer.  Amnesty proposes that the States that have legalized 
marijuana immediately remediate all negative effects of past, non violent 
marijuana laws, and effectively obliterate past, non-violent pot offenses, 
including investigatory stops and arrests.  Additionally, it provides that past 
pot offenders are entitled to a broad list of remedies, inclusive of 
compensation, to aggressively erase the direct and collateral effects of past 
pot laws.322  Despite the overwhelming bases for the right of retroactivity, 
there are critics of automatic or comprehensive retroactive amelioration 
whose perspectives deserve a response. 
This section responds to two positions against the right to retroactive 
amelioration and amnesty as a proposed solution.  The first critique is that 
the right to retroactive amelioration preempts legislative authority.  The 
second criticism is that the right of retroactive amelioration, especially in the 
form of amnesty, is too expensive to implement.  Each critique is 
accompanied by a response, which provides how the benefits of the solution 
outweigh its possible shortcomings. 
 
 321. See McDonald, supra note 92.  
 322. See infra Addendum, the Marijuana Amnesty Code (hereinafter “MAC”) provides that all 
laws, which intentionally or unintentionally discriminate against past pot offenders are hereby 
deemed unconstitutional infringements on individual’s inalienable, constitutional rights against 
discrimination, such laws include but are not limited to employment, licensing, voting, travel, and 
immigration; such laws are hereby mandatorily void and unenforceable, in such a manner to treat 
past pot offenders as a protected class, subject to strict scrutiny.  These provisions are tangential 
and are beyond the purview of this Article. 
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1. Preempts Legislative Discretion 
Some critics might argue that amnesty wrongfully preempts legislative 
authority, as it deprives the legislature of the power to restrict the scope of 
the legalization laws that it enacted.  Critics might even explain that such 
preemption would serve as a disincentive to marijuana law reform.  
Similarly, prosecutors might view amnesty as being overly broad in that 
some “marijuana offenses” were, in fact, proxies for other drug-related 
offenses, such as trafficking and/possession of other illicit drugs.  As a result, 
they would complain that amnesty would exonerate criminals who were not 
intended to be relieved. 
In response, I believe that amnesty is the most practical solution to a 
right that the Constitution guarantees to past pot offenders, the right to 
retroactivity of marijuana legalization laws.  Viewed from that perspective, 
once a State has chosen to legalize marijuana, it has no choice but to make it 
retroactive.  While amnesty might mean that a few past offenders might get 
a slightly undeserved break, that is a minor by comparison to the injustice to 
those who have suffered from over-sentencing and unconscionable 
convictions. 
2. Too Expensive 
Some critics claim that amnesty would be too expensive to implement, 
as it provides a blanket remedy to a large class of people.  As a result, some 
lawmakers might claim that implementing amnesty would pose a financial 
burden on states.  Furthermore, some critics might argue that such a notable 
transformation in a criminal justice system based on mass incarceration, 
over-charging, and disparate sentences would be administratively untenable. 
In response, I believe that amnesty would be a positive solution to 
address the WOD’s negative, direct, and collateral consequence on people’s 
lives, arresting people for drug possession is costly to society.323  First and 
foremost, the criminalization of pot is a source of violence, pitting police 
officers against the communities they police.324  Second, it places an 
incredibly high enforcement burden on an already strained criminal justice 
system, taking valuable resources from serious criminal infractions.325  And 
third, it is extremely expensive to prosecute and incarcerate pot offenders, 
most of whom are nonviolent, misdemeanor, first-time offenders.326 
 
 323. See supra note 88, Common Sense for Drug Policy, Drug War Policy, https://www.drug 
warfacts.org/ (last visited July 17, 2019). 
 324. See Blanks, supra note 23 (noting that “[p]olice are incentivized to initiate unnecessary 
contact with pedestrians and motorists, and they do so most often against ethnic and racial 
minorities.  Such over-policing engenders resentment among minority communities and 
jeopardizes public safety.” Id.).  
 325. See CRIM. JUSTICE POL’Y FOUND., supra note 20. 
 326. Id.  
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Furthermore, to those critics, I say that the harm to society and to the 
victims of the continuing inequities of our unjust criminal justice system is 
untenable and makes the cost of change immaterial.  Besides, legalization is 
creating a new marijuana industry, with a new source of tax revenue and 
economic development.  Thus, I propose the answer is the MAC, which 
provides a “Pot Victim Relief and Compensation Fund.”  It could be funded 
from the increased tax revenues from legalization and the cost savings from 
freeing incarcerated, nonviolent pot offenders.  Overall, I believe that the 
increased tax revenue from legalized marijuana should be used to provide 
the funding and other resources needed to facilitate the remediation of past 
offenders.  Therefore, in creating a better world, we should free the innocent 
and exonerate the victims of the WOD. 
Proposition #3: This discussion of the constitutional and fundamental 
principles leads to the next proposition, that past pot offenders have a right 
to be judged by a new, lessen, substantive criminal standard and, therefore, 
are entitled to retroactive amelioration, and that amnesty is the practical 
remedy to deliver on this right to a broad group of people. 
In summary, Part III argues that past pot offenders are entitled to the 
retroactive application of marijuana legalization law.  It shows that 
constitutional principles and recent Supreme Court decisions grant past 
criminal offenders the right to retroactive application of substantive changes 
in the law.  Further, it is argued that legalization of marijuana is a substantive 
change resulting from amendments in State constitutions.  By the right of 
retroactivity, embodied in the concept of lex mitior, past pot offenders must 
be judged by the new, lessened standards of marijuana criminal culpability.  
As a result, such offenders need not rely on a restricted view of retroactivity 
rules, from a top-down perspective, in which past offenders must pray for 
the mercy of the government.  Instead, past pot offenders are entitled to view 
retroactivity from a bottom-up, substantive rights-based viewpoint.  
Moreover, recognizing that millions of past pot offenders are entitled to 
retroactive amelioration, this Article proposes amnesty as a comprehensive 
means to redress such relief.  Lastly, it briefly explains how amnesty 
withstands critics, as it reflects the preemptive authority of constitutional 
principles over State legislative discretion, and it is ultimately cost effective. 
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Conclusion 
In the movie Back to the Future, Doc Brown travels into the future to 
warn Marty McFly of impending events “back in time,” that threaten Marty’s 
present existence.327  Today, States that have legalized marijuana, and those 
that contemplate doing so, face a similar problem: whether legalization 
applies retroactively to past offenses.  In other words, should the Marty 
McFlys of prelegalization time be exonerated retroactively for past offenses, 
because they deserve to be judged by today’s criminal standards? 
Currently, the retroactivity practices fail to address the problems of our 
criminal justice system, produce inconsistent and unsatisfactory results, lack 
a guiding principle, and, most importantly, leave past offenders in prison or 
living with the stigma of being a pot offender.  With the legalization of 
marijuana, past offenders are entitled to be freed from the penalties and 
stigma from antiquated laws.  It is inherently unfair to continue punishing 
past offenders for activities in a state that now deems those activities to be 
legal. 
This Article claims that past pot offenders have a constitutional right to 
retroactive amelioration, in States that have legalized marijuana.  
Recognizing that the implementation of such a broad-based right is 
burdensome, this Article suggests that amnesty is a practical, comprehensive 
means to provide remedial action in a swift and certain manner.  In 
conclusion, society as a whole will greatly benefit from returning past pot 
offenders to normal lives, freed from onerous prison sentences and from the 
stigma of a criminal record. 
*** 
As noted in Part II of this Article, the following is my proposed code 
that government, courts, and policymakers should adopt to provide past pot 
offenders with retroactive amelioration. 
Addendum, Marijuana Amnesty Code 
A. Provisions 
WHEREAS, there is a cultural and political shift relating to the safety and 
benefits of marijuana and in the minor, nonviolent use, possession, 
cultivation, sale, and distribution of small amounts of the same; 
WHEREAS, the War on Drugs has failed to stop the use of marijuana and 
has resulted in, direct and indirect, negative impacts on the lives of millions 
of Americans; and the prohibition of marijuana has been utilized by the legal 
 
 327. See BACK TO THE FUTURE, supra note 1. 
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system to denigrate, investigate, and infiltrate the private, protected spheres 
of our society; 
WHEREAS, there are ongoing efforts at every level of government to 
address how marijuana laws negatively impact our criminal justice system, 
including racial inequities, wasted resources in the policing, prosecution, and 
incarceration of such offenses in crowded prison conditions, and the 
collateral consequences of these offenses; 
WHEREAS, the criminalization of marijuana has resulted in the 
incarceration of hundreds of thousands of non-violent offenders, some of 
whom are serving life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; 
WHEREAS, the criminalization of marijuana has produced negative, 
collateral damage to the lives of millions of Americans, creating a second-
class citizenry; 
WHEREAS, society as a whole, especially past pot offenders and their 
families, have been and continue to be harmed by such past criminalization, 
imprisonment, or collateral consequences of having a criminal record and 
there is a recognized need to reconcile this past intrusion on privacy, to 
provide amnesty to victims of the War on Drugs, and to compensate the 
victims and remediate the communities negatively impacted from past 
marijuana laws; 
WHEREAS, it is inherently unfair to permit current and future marijuana 
activities to be legal without applying the same legal standard of culpability 
to past pot offenders and that the rules of retroactivity are unsatisfactory, 
inconsistent, and do not provide for the automatic retroactive amelioration 
of past arrests, pleas, convictions, and sentences; 
WHEREAS, the U.S. Supreme Court has established a right to retroactive 
application of substantive changes in the law, and that the legalization of 
marijuana is such a substantive change; 
WHEREAS, the U.S. Constitution embraces the fundamental principle of 
lex mitior as a reflection of our commitment to due process as codified in the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, as well as in the penumbra of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, including the right 
of habeas corpus; 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the principle of lex mitior, all offenders are 
exonerated from a past offense when a change in the criminal law lessens, 
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reduces, or eliminates certain criminal behavior, whether the change in the 
law expressly provides for amelioration, is silent, or even denies such relief; 
WHEREAS, this Code recognizes Amnesty for past pot offenders whose 
criminality is ameliorated due to a lessened standard of criminal culpability: 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ENACTED that the Marijuana Amnesty Code 
(hereinafter “MAC”) provides as follows: that all levels of government, to 
the highest extent of their powers and authorities, are hereby mandated to 
“exonerate” all such past marijuana-related offenses, both criminal and civil, 
when the substantive criminal law is lessened, in such a manner wherein 
those offenses are now deemed legal or may be interpreted as being legal.  
This mandate is self-evident and does not require supplemental action other 
than the immediate endeavors needed to facilitate these requisites.  This 
means that the past offenses must be viewed as if the current laws were in 
force and in effect when the past offenses occurred.  Additionally, this Code 
creates the “Pot Victim Relief and Compensation Fund,” and directs that fifty 
percent of all revenues derived from by marijuana taxes be used to 
compensate each and every past offender and to reconcile/remediate the 
damages suffered by their families and their communities.  Next, this Code 
requires that any and all laws that discriminate against past pot offenders, 
including but not limited to employment, licensing, voting, travel, and 
immigration, be void, as pot offenders are a protected class under the 
individual civil liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, including the 
anti-discrimination laws. 
In this Code, the terms “exonerate,” “amnesty,” and “ameliorate” shall 
embrace the spirit of the ameliorative goal of the code, that is, to remove any 
and all negative impacts from the prior, now antiquated law.  Such 
amelioration shall include any and all of the following remedies: a. release 
from imprisonment; b. reduction of sentencing; c. parole for life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, where appropriate; d. nunc 
pro tunc; e. expungement; f. seal of criminal record; g. 
remission/reimbursement of fines and penalties; h. pardons; i. letters of good 
standing for licensing and employment purposes; j. executive clemency; k. 
commutation of sentence; l. restitution; and m. reprieve. 
B. Explanation 
In summary, the provisions of the MAC reflect the following four 
tenets: 
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1. The MAC declares that lex mitior is a fundamental principle that is 
embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution and requires that 
citizens in all substantive criminal matters be judged by the lessor of the legal 
standards of culpability, when a latter law lessens the present and future 
criminal behavior, as applied to marijuana legalization. 
2. The MAC recognizes amnesty and orders retroactive exoneration, 
automatically and immediately, as the application of a fundamental 
constitutional, inalienable right that is guaranteed to each individual, of 
which cannot be infringed upon without due process, when a jurisdiction 
lessens its criminal substantive marijuana standard of culpability. 
3. The MAC mandates that public officials in states that legalize 
marijuana remediate all negative effects of past marijuana laws, inclusive of 
effectively obliterating and all past pot offenses, including investigatory 
stops and arrests.  Further, it provides that past pot offenders are entitled to 
a broad list of remedies, inclusive of compensation, to aggressively erase the 
direct and collateral effects of past pot laws. 
4. The MAC determines that all laws, which intentionally or 
unintentionally discriminate against past pot offenders are hereby deemed 
unconstitutional infringements on an individual’s inalienable, constitutional 
rights against discrimination, such laws include but are not limited to 
employment, licensing, voting, travel, and immigration; such laws are 
hereby mandatorily void and unenforceable, in such a manner to treat past 
pot offenders as a protected class, subject to strict scrutiny. 
In conclusion, the MAC restores full citizenship rights to past offenders 
and constitutes a win-win, as it exonerates past pot offenders, through 
remediation and compensation, while raising tax revenue for the state and 
reducing the costs of incarceration. 
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